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Summary and Conclusions 
Situation and Outlook in Brief 
The Gezira Irrigation Scheme was established in 
1925 and enlarged to its present capacity of 2.1 
million feddans of irrigable area (882.000 ha) in 
the early 1960s. The scheme occupies the area 
between the Blue and the White Niles about one 
taxi hour north of Khartoum, the Sudan’s capital. 
The scheme still contributes some 3 % to the GDP 
of the country. It provides the opportunity of a 
basic livelihood to 114.000 tenant families, other 
job opportunities for 0.5–1.0 million casual work-
ers and employs a staff of about 7000 qualified 
administrators, technicians, scientists, clerks and 
craftsmen. The irrigable area cannot be run at 
capacity unless the overall infrastructure and cen-
tral services of the scheme are in good shape. 
The Gezira comprises about 42 % of the estab-
lished irrigation area of the Sudan and uses about 
35 % of the Nile waters allocated to the Sudan in 
the Nile Water Agreement with Egypt. With the 
economy of the Sudan regaining its balance and 
doing away with inflation in the course of its oil 
sector developments, prospects are favourable for 
overall economic development. In the context of 
such perspectives, the Gezira’s contribution to the 
inland food markets – naturally protected by long 
road distances and high transport costs between 
Khartoum and Port Sudan – has eventually a cen-
tral role to play. To what extent such possibilities 
will be realised depends, of course, very much on 
the country's future policies – in particular on its 
exchange rate policies and on its price, market and 
trade policies for the agricultural sector. 
The management and service structure of an irri-
gation scheme as large as the Gezira can by ne-
cessity not do without a centrally organized and 
managed administration and centralised services. 
Future efforts to (further) liberalize management 
and services will have to look very carefully at 
which components can be liberalized and which 
not, since water allocation f.e. could not be liber-
alized for technical and organizational reasons, at 
least not without incurring costs for control and 
enforcement which would render the whole 
scheme grossly uneconomic. 
The scheme’s infrastructure and services have run 
down more or less continuously since the indus-
try-centred development policies of the 1970s and 
during the precarious situation of government 
finances throughout the 1970s and 1980s up to the 
mid 1990s. In the course of all these years average 
crop profits per hectare have been reduced on 
average to some 75 % of the level of the early 
1970s in real terms. At present they stand at about 
90 % of this base line reference level. Further-
more the cropped area has undergone pronounced 
fluctuations, which, in certain years, grossly crip-
pled the financial and economic performance of 
the scheme. 
As to the future role and economic competitive-
ness of the scheme the prospects are principally 
very good for the following reasons: 
— There are big, practically proven reserves of 
physical yields, which can be realised if infra-
structure and services are thoroughly rehabili-
tated and adequately reorganized and, fur-
thermore, favourable macro and agricultural 
policies are maintained. 
— There is a considerable margin of “natural” 
import protection for food products (in par-
ticular perishables), as mentioned above. 
— There are sound prospects of high growth 
rates for inland demand, particularly in the 
Khartoum area. 
— In spite of a considerable brain drain in the 
past, there still are sufficient numbers of able 
and experienced administrators, economists, 
agronomists, technicians as well as clerical 
workers and craftsmen. 
Dangers might in part lie in future temptations to 
overstaff and an ensuing renaissance of overcen-
tralisation. Full government coffers tend to make 
for that – wherever in this world. 
 
 A.M. Eldaw 
 
II 
Perspectives for Sustained Development 
The performance of the Gezira Scheme has been 
extensively studied during the past 30 years. Sev-
eral scholars from various domestic academic 
institutions have conducted many of these studies, 
while a large body of literature has accrued from 
studies initiated by the government in collabora-
tion with international institutions, including the 
World Bank, FAO, IBRD, GDI and others. In 
addition, the Gezira Research Station and other 
institutions of the Agricultural Research Corpora-
tion have conducted a bulk of research focussing 
on almost all aspects of crop technology devel-
opment. While most of this research has located 
the roots of the inefficiency of the scheme’s per-
formance, almost all authors have acknowledged 
the potential of the scheme for sustainable devel-
opment under the condition that proposed reme-
dies be implemented. However, a variety of hin-
drances have impeded the implementation of pro-
posed remedies. These include a wide range of 
elements that have evolved from the political and 
macro-economic developments of the country 
throughout the post-independent era. In addition, 
the attitude of the whole range of stakeholders of 
the scheme to changes and the posture of the in-
ternational community in addressing cooperation 
relations with Sudan have contributed to encum-
bering the implementation of actions for sustained 
development. 
Nonetheless, there are currently some notable 
developments that provide the required environ-
ment for changes and adjustments for sustainable 
development in the Gezira Scheme. Hence, there 
are broad indications of improvements of the 
country's economy, political stability and external 
relations. These developments, together with 
sound domestic and export market prospects for 
products from the Gezira Scheme, provide a good 
basis for sustainable development of the Gezira 
Scheme. 
Political Stability and External Relations 
After long years of political instability as well as 
international and regional isolation, in addition to 
civil war in the south, the Government of Sudan 
embarked on a wide range of political improve-
ments. The government’s conduct in containing 
internal political conflicts has changed from con-
frontation with opposing groups to consultation 
with these groups. This development has repre-
sented a turning point for the important opposing 
parties to depart from exile opposition and to en-
gage in internal opposition. The government has 
undertaken further steps toward reforming the 
political atmosphere by widening its appreciation 
of human rights and the rights of self-
determination and freedom of the press.  
However, the government's most important 
achievement was commencement of intensive 
peace negotiations with the Sudanese Peoples’ 
Liberation Army (SPLA), which has been in 
armed confrontation with the central government 
army in southern Sudan since 1983. As a result of 
these negotiations, which are running under the 
umbrella of IGAD, a cease-fire agreement was 
signed between the government and the SPLA 
about a year ago. Within the same context, the 
armed confrontations in the Nuba Mountains were 
terminated. 
The improving internal political environment, 
especially the positive developments with regard 
to armed confrontations, have resulted in a further 
lessening of the tensions in Sudan’s external rela-
tions. As a result, Sudan's political, financial and 
economic relations with the important interna-
tional organizations and the principal political 
centres have improved substantially.  
In consequence of the above, the Sudan now 
seems to have managed to start establishing a 
promising environment for a firmer political 
foundation than in most periods of the past two 
decades on which to build economic strength and 
development. 
The Macro-Economic Environment 
Sudan has made substantial progress over the past 
five years since 1998 in achieving macroeconomic 
stability and advancing structural reforms. The 
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economy responded positively to the reforms ini-
tiated in 1997/98. Following years of stagnation 
and triple digit inflation rates, economic growth 
averaged about 6.5 % while inflation declined to 
less than 5 % during 1998–2002. In addition, sus-
tained efforts brought the fiscal position under 
control, with the budget deficit averaging about 
1 % of GDP over the period 1999–2002. Substan-
tial progress was also achieved with structural 
reforms. Price controls were lifted and all eco-
nomic activities were opened to the private sector, 
while a liberal foreign trade regime was estab-
lished and an ambitious privatization program was 
adopted. The exchange rate was unified and the 
exchange system was significantly liberalized, and 
currently there is no difference between official 
and unofficial exchange rates. As regards interna-
tional trade, export earnings recorded increasing 
growth rates during the period 1998–2001 and 
became more diversified as a result of increasing 
petroleum exports and expanding exports of live-
stock products, sesame and gold. This develop-
ment enabled Sudan to resume debt service. With 
regard to trade reform, non-tariff trade barriers 
were essentially eliminated and protective tariffs 
were heavily reduced. On the fiscal front, expen-
diture management has been strengthened and 
almost all price subsidies have been eliminated. 
Moreover, tax and customs administrations have 
been significantly improved and the value-added 
tax has been introduced. Similarly, more progress 
has been achieved in strengthening and restructur-
ing the banking system and liberalizing the finan-
cial system. 
Improving economic performance and growing 
confidence in the stability and growth of the na-
tional economy have provided a sound basis for 
investment in agricultural production in the Gezira 
Scheme. Thus, improving economic growth is 
expected to stimulate and expand demand for 
agricultural output, while reduction of the infla-
tion rate is expected to reduce the pressure of fi-
nancial costs on producers and decrease the inter-
est rates for credit. Similarly, a positive balance of 
payments will make it possible to import more 
inputs, and a domestic budget surplus will in-
crease financing for investments and development 
of infrastructure. 
The Socio-Geographical Environment 
The recent socio-demographic changes in Sudan, 
which have largely been due to environmental 
factors during the past decades, have given addi-
tional importance to irrigated agriculture in sus-
taining agricultural growth and providing food 
and employment. Within this context, the Gezira 
Scheme is assuming special importance because 
of its geographic location, size and potential for 
crop production. Thus, the location of the scheme 
in the centre of the country and, especially in the 
vicinity of the large urban centre Khartoum (with 
a population over 6 million inhabitants), provides 
additional prospects for an expanded market ori-
ented food production. On this basis, more options 
will be available for crop diversification in the 
Gezira Scheme and hence at the same time for 
diversification and expansion of opportunities to 
raise producer incomes.  
Stakeholder Attitudes to Changes 
The major stakeholders of the Gezira Scheme 
have been concerned for many years about the 
Scheme’s technical and economic efficiency as 
well as the heavy demands it places on public 
resources. Realizing the increasing pressure on the 
public budget and the need for competitive pro-
duction for future agricultural trading opportuni-
ties, the government of Sudan, the Sudan Gezira 
Board and the Tenants’ Union of the Gezira 
Scheme became aware of the need to search for 
strategies and policies to improve the efficiency of 
the scheme. This situation provoked a nation-wide 
intensive discussion of the problems of the Gezira 
Scheme and possible solutions to these problems. 
As a result, there is currently a growing consensus 
among stakeholders on the need for an expanded 
tenant participation in decision-making and the 
selection of cultivated crops and crop rotation as 
well as the need for institutional reform and 
enlargement of the involvement of the private 
sector in delivering services.   
 A.M. Eldaw 
 
IV 
Market Prospects for the Gezira Scheme’s 
Products 
The available literature on the Gezira Scheme 
emphasizes the sound market prospects of the 
Gezira Scheme’s products. Hence, although cot-
ton markets are extremely competitive, there are 
still substantial market prospects for cotton from 
the Gezira Scheme (World Bank 2000). There are 
also sound market prospects for the other main 
products from the Gezira Scheme like sorghum 
and groundnuts. Market prospects may also be 
promising even for wheat, provided that yields 
can be increased to levels that render it competi-
tive against imported wheat.  
However, there are additional factors that enhance 
the market prospects for agricultural products 
from the Gezira Scheme. The increasing govern-
ment endeavours to expand the export of livestock 
and horticultural products in order to diversify and 
expand the country's agricultural exports provide 
additional market prospects for the Gezira 
Scheme. Hence, the resources available within the 
Gezira Scheme provide excellent conditions for 
livestock production as well as for the production 
of a variety of horticultural products. These pros-
pects are very promising not only because of the 
location of the Gezira Scheme and the available 
transportation infrastructure but also because of 
expanding demand for livestock and horticultural 
exports in the nearby markets of Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf countries.  
Agricultural Policy Perspectives 
The declared government agricultural policy em-
phasizes continuation of the liberalization policies 
adopted since the early 1990s. Accordingly, 
measures were planned, with the support of the 
IMF, for further reduction of the role of the public 
sector in agricultural production, provision of 
services and agricultural marketing and a corre-
spondingly enlarged private sector involvement in 
the delivery of services. 
The government-planned policies aim at increas-
ing the effectiveness of public sector organiza-
tions in focusing on the construction and mainte-
nance of the major infrastructure and increasing 
the involvement of the private sector in taking 
primary responsibility in the provision of services. 
It is expected that public sector organizations like 
the Gezira Board will focus on the maintenance of 
the irrigation network for efficient distribution of 
irrigation water in addition to the provision of 
core support services like agricultural research, 
agricultural extension and market information. At 
the same time, it is expected that the private sector 
will take primary responsibility in the provision of 
services such as land preparation and sale of in-
puts. These policies are, therefore, expected to 
lead to wider tenant participation in decision-
making for production, marketing and allocation 
of resources and hence to provide the basis for 
more incentives for tenants to improve the effi-
ciency of their husbandry practices in order to 
increase their incomes. 
Areas for International Cooperation 
The Sudan is endowed with enormous agricultural 
resources. It has large land reserves, adequate 
water resources and a high livestock population. 
These resources, together with the geographical 
location of the country in the vicinity of the large 
markets of the Arab World (Saudi Arabia, the 
Gulf States and Libya) and the diversity of the 
Sudan’s climate, qualify Sudan as a promising 
supplier of agricultural commodities.  
In addition, the various subsectors of the Sudanese 
economy provide good opportunities for fruitful 
cooperation with respective industries from the 
industrialized world. These opportunities lie 
within the service industries for agriculture, the 
processing industry, the communication sector, 
and the transportation and trade sectors and, re-
cently, in the emerging petroleum sector with all 
its associated industries.  
Moreover, there are critical factors that underline 
the interesting position of the Sudan as a potential 
partner for economic cooperation. These include 
advances in political stability, recovering micro-
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economic indicators and improving external rela-
tions.  
Given the past development path of Sudan, the 
entire potential of the country has remained basi-
cally untapped. While Sudan still lacks the re-
quired capacities and resources for drafting and 
implementing development plans to utilize avail-
able resources and attain progress, the Govern-
ment of Sudan is laying heavy emphasis on the 
importance of development cooperation with the 
international community, especially from Ger-
many and the European Union.  
The areas of required development cooperation 
include technical assistance to the government in 
the form of policy advice as well as capacity and 
institution building and provision of information, 
access and relevant arrangements for economic 
cooperation of the German private sector with the 
Sudanese private sector. 
The fields open for policy advice include privati-
sation of state owned enterprises, development of 
private service industries and liberalization of 
trade. Thus, Sudan has already started out on a 
liberalization process for state owned enterprises. 
Many small agricultural schemes, for example the 
Blue Nile Agricultural Corporation, the White 
Nile agricultural Corporation and the Northern 
Province Agricultural Corporation, have been 
privatised. However, for lack of experience and 
capacities for planning and implementation of 
privatisation programs, severe difficulties have 
been encountered. Therefore, policy advice in this 
regard is of high priority. Similarly, the Sudan 
lacks the experience and capacities required for 
development of private sector enterprises to un-
dertake activities which have previously been 
undertaken by state organizations, such as provi-
sion of services for the agricultural sector, credit 
provision and marketing.  
As regards the field of capacity building, far more 
technical assistance is required to strengthen the 
base of economic research, policy planning and 
policy analysis. Such assistance can be rendered 
directly by strengthening specific education insti-
tutions, provision of study grants and launching of 
joint training programs with local universities and 
research institutions and indirectly through joint 
research projects and studies. 
The technical assistance required in the field of 
institutional development includes training of 
personnel in management of financing, marketing 
and service industries, in addition to implementa-
tion of support programs for existing institutions 
through provision of experienced personnel to 
assist in the development of these institutions and 
enhancement of their capabilities.  
Moreover, high priority should be given to facili-
tating the access of Sudanese private sector enter-
prises to respective German enterprises through 
relevant support for participation in exhibitions, 
provision of information about market regulation 
and rules and support of relations between trade 
chambers in Sudan and Germany.  
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1
1 Introduction 
At present Sudan’s economy is predominantly 
based on agriculture. The importance of agricul-
ture rests on its contributions to GDP, exports, 
employment and production of food and raw ma-
terials for industries. The Sudanese agricultural 
sector comprises three subsystems: the irrigation 
subsystem, the mechanized subsystem and the 
traditional subsystem. Irrigated agriculture plays 
an important role in the Sudanese economy. It 
accounts for a substantial share of agricultural 
GDP and it produces most of the country’s crop of 
cotton, sugar cane, wheat, legumes, peanuts, fruits 
and vegetables. In addition, irrigated agriculture 
accounts for a substantial share of groundnut and 
food production and represents an important base 
for livestock production.  
Irrigated agriculture comprises many public 
schemes. Among these, the Gezira Scheme is the 
oldest and, area-wise, the largest one. The Scheme 
occupies a central position in the agricultural sec-
tor of Sudan. In relation to the total area under 
irrigation, the area of the Gezira Scheme accounts 
for about 42 %, and it utilizes some 35 % of Su-
dan’s current allocation of irrigation water (Ah-
med 2000). While irrigated agriculture contributes 
about 13 %1, on average, to national GDP and 
about 33 % to agricultural GDP, the share of the 
Gezira Scheme’s contribution to national and 
agricultural GDP is estimated at 3 % and 7 %, 
respectively (World Bank 2000). In terms of its 
physical contribution, the Gezira Scheme has con-
tributed significant proportions to the country’s 
agricultural production during the past decades. 
Thus, about 2/3 of Sudan’s cotton exports and 
about 70 %, 30 % and 12 % of the country’s total 
production of wheat, groundnuts and sorghum, 
respectively, originate from the Gezira Scheme 
(Magar 1986; Brandt et al. 1987).  
Within the Gezira region, the Gezira Scheme is of 
overwhelming importance. The value of infra-
structure within the Scheme is estimated at about 
US $ 8 billion (Omara 2002). The importance of 
                                                     
1 Average of 1991–1997. 
the Scheme, however, increases when the value of 
infrastructure within other institutions that are 
directly or indirectly associated with the Gezira 
Scheme is taken into consideration. Moreover, the 
Gezira Scheme is eminently important because the 
whole of the economy and social life within the 
region are bound up with the Scheme’s activities. 
Thus, the Scheme provides livelihoods for 
114,000 tenant families as well as for some 7,000 
permanent employees (previously, i.e. before 
1990, 13,000 employees) and between 0.5–1 mil-
lion casual labourers, and it accommodates over 2 
million head of livestock (Galal 1997). 
1.1 Context of the Problem 
Long-term developments of performance indica-
tors for major crops in the Gezira Scheme reveal a 
steady decline and/or stagnation of output of cot-
ton, wheat and groundnuts. Thus, compared to an 
annual average acreage in the range of 0.5–0.6 
million feddans during the 1970s, cotton cultiva-
tion dropped during the period 1995–2002 to the 
lowest level it has ever attained, in the range of 
0.15–0.33 million feddans.2 In addition, average 
cotton yields decreased and underwent heavy 
fluctuations through the 1980s and 1990s. The 
maximum average yield attained during the late 
1990s was only 4 kantars/feddan, while this figure 
dropped sharply in 1999/01 to reach just about 2.5 
kantars/feddan. These developments, however, 
caused cotton exports – once Sudan's major export 
product  – to fall from 22 per cent of total export 
earnings in 1995 to 2.5 percent in 2000. 
Like cotton, wheat and groundnut cultivation have 
declined during the past decades. The area under 
wheat production declined from over 0.5 million 
feddans during the early 1990s to a very low level 
in the range of 0.06–0.08 million feddans during 
1999/00–2001/02. The decline in acreage was 
accompanied by high fluctuations and a falling 
trend in wheat yields, and thus wheat imports 
have had to be substantially expanded to meet 
domestic food requirements. Accordingly, the 
                                                     
2 1 feddan = 0.4 ha. 
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value of Sudanese wheat imports increased from 
US $ 31.2 million in 1992 to over US $ 175 mil-
lion in 2000 (Bank of Sudan 2001). Similarly, the 
declining trend in groundnut production contrib-
uted to a decrease in groundnut exports to about 
US $ 0.02 million in 1999 compared with about 
US $ 39 million in 1976. 
In contrast to the development of cotton, wheat 
and groundnuts, sorghum cultivation and yields 
increased substantially during the 1990s. The area 
under sorghum increased from an average of 
about 0.3 million feddans during the 1970s to over 
0.6 million feddans during the early 1990s. This is 
partly due to the government policy of providing 
for food security. In addition, shortage of finance 
and inputs for capital-intensive products like cot-
ton and wheat and a shortage of irrigation water 
due to the run-down state of irrigation infrastruc-
ture have contributed to the expansion of sorghum 
cultivation at the expense of export and import 
substitution crops. To these bottlenecks must be 
added the incentive of a rising relative profitabil-
ity of sorghum. 
The origins of the above developments are multi-
fold. Macroeconomic difficulties, in addition to 
institutional weaknesses, infrastructure and tech-
nology deficiencies as well as falling real crop 
profitabilities have contributed to generating the 
problems faced by Gezira farmers and other 
scheme stakeholders. 
Based on a close interdependence between Su-
dan’s agriculture and national economy, the for-
tunes of the Gezira Scheme are basically depend-
ent on the performance of the economy. However, 
sustained economic growth in Sudan has been 
hampered throughout the past decades. Huge defi-
cits in the balance of payments, a heavily overval-
ued exchange rate, escalating inflation and large 
budget deficits characterized the period from the 
late 1970s through the 1990s. The core problem 
here is a substantial and persistent budget deficit. 
In addition, the civil war in the south and frequent 
droughts, together with political isolation, brain 
drain and deterioration of basic infrastructure, 
have aggravated the situation. 
Given the above state of affairs, rising inflation 
and heightened interest rates for credit have 
placed more financial cost pressure on producers, 
whereas the balance of payments deficit has made 
it more difficult to obtain imported inputs. More-
over, domestic budget deficits have decreased the 
financing opportunities for crop cultivation, in-
vestments and development of infrastructure. 
In addition, the Gezira Scheme has always been 
encumbered by a unique institutional set-up which 
reduced the managerial and economic efficiency 
of the scheme. Hence, the Gezira Scheme has 
adopted a uniform crop rotation which constrains 
private economic choices on cropping patterns. 
The current production relations, including cen-
tralized decision-making on production and mar-
keting for major crops and centralized manage-
ment of irrigation water, limit the options of farm-
ers for an efficient allocation of resources and 
affect their benefits substantially. Pan-territorial 
charges and payments provide fewer incentives to 
farmers.  
The performance of irrigated agriculture is further 
aggravated by the deterioration of the scheme’s 
infrastructure and absence of technical progress. 
Lack of funds and the Gezira Scheme's mounting 
debts, in addition to inefficient recovery of over-
head costs at the tenant level, have made it impos-
sible to replace the aging irrigation infrastructure 
and exacerbated maintenance problems of the 
silted canalisation system. As a result, inefficient 
and wasteful water distribution became the rule 
and expansion in acreage and productivity of 
crops was limited. Accordingly, the total culti-
vated area of the Scheme declined during the late 
1990s to levels far below the developed capacity 
of the irrigated area. In addition, the financial 
shortages of the Gezira Scheme led, further, to 
inadequate maintenance of equipment, machinery 
and transport infrastructure and difficulties in 
replacing them, the outcome being inefficient 
processing of output (ginning of cotton) and trans-
fer of inputs and outputs.  
Based on the above, a typical Gezira farm has 
become unable to provide an income above the 
poverty line for an average farmer family in the 
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Gezira. As a result, the Gezira Scheme has be-
come uneconomic from the national as well as 
from the farmer’s viewpoint.  
1.2 Future Prospects for Sustainable 
Developments 
Given the importance of the Gezira Scheme for 
the Sudan, and the current state of affairs; i.e. the 
deterioration of its performance, the legitimate 
question to be answered would be: Are there any 
future prospects for sustainable development of 
the Scheme? 
The available literature, especially that on poten-
tial crop yields in the Gezira, provides ample evi-
dence for potential economic competitiveness. In 
addition, there are positive developments that 
enhance future prospects of irrigated agriculture in 
the Sudan. These include improving macroeco-
nomic performance and growing confidence in the 
stability and growth of the national economy. 
Thus, recent reports and economic studies on Su-
dan note an improving economic situation, espe-
cially from 1997 through 2002 (IMF 2002). This 
assertion is based on recovering macroeconomic 
indicators and a perceived conducive economic 
environment. Hence, the Sudan’s GDP and export 
earnings grew and inflation declined, while the 
exchange rate was freed and tariffs on interna-
tional trade were sharply reduced. In addition, 
recent substantial oil exports and the livestock 
trade have rendered Sudan’s foreign exchange 
earnings more diversified and relieved the gov-
ernment budget substantially.  
On this basis, improved economic growth is ex-
pected to stimulate demand for agricultural out-
put, while reduction of inflation rates and de-
creased interest rates for credit will mitigate the 
cost pressure on producers. Similarly, a positive 
balance of payments will make it possible to im-
port more inputs, and rising public income will 
increase financing opportunities for investments 
and the development of infrastructure. 
In addition, there are positive attitudes towards 
institutional and management change. The Gov-
ernment of Sudan has been concerned for many 
years about the Scheme’s technical and economic 
efficiency as well as its heavy demands on public 
resources. Realizing the increasing pressure on the 
public budget and the need for competitive pro-
duction for future agricultural trading opportuni-
ties, the government became aware of the need to 
search for strategies and policies to improve the 
efficiency of the Gezira Scheme.  
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
This study attempts to analyse the performance of 
the Gezira Scheme with the objective of identify-
ing the institutional, infrastructural, policy and 
management constraints to sustainable develop-
ment of crop production in the Scheme. In doing 
so, the specific objectives of the study include: 
— An assessment of the available technology, 
infrastructure and institutional set-up for crop 
production and management in the Gezira 
Scheme. 
— An analysis of past and present performance 
of the scheme with regard to development of 
cropping intensity, cropped areas, yield and 
output performance. 
— Evaluation of the financial and economic 
profitability of specific crops in the standard 
rotation of the Gezira Scheme. 
— Qualitative assessment of the impact of 
government policies on crop output and prices 
as well as on the competitiveness of cultivated 
crops. 
1.4 Approach of the Study 
The first part of this study provides a background 
as to the establishment of the Gezira Scheme and 
the organization of crop production and produc-
tion relations. Next, the available infrastructure 
and institutions within the Scheme and the ser-
vices provided are reviewed. Third, a review of 
policies adopted with regard to irrigated agricul-
ture is provided and, in a fourth part, the devel-
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opments in cultivated areas and crop performance 
resulting from adopted policies and prevailing 
constraints of infrastructure and institutional ar-
rangements are analysed, based on three-year 
moving average growth rates. In addition, nominal 
and effective protection coefficients are calculated 
with the use of the technique of Policy Analysis 
Matrix, PAM. Finally, a review is provided of 
possible causes of unsatisfactory performance in 
years past as well as perspectives for sustainable 
development. 
2 Overall Performance of the Economy 
of Sudan 
The basic macroeconomic indicators during the 
early 1970s showed modest growth of agricultural 
production, GDP and agricultural GDP; all grow-
ing at about 3.5 % (FAO 1975). Although cotton 
exports grew at a higher rate than before, average 
annual export growth was estimated at 3.3 %. The 
increase in per capita income was very small, 
investments and savings stood at about 10 % and 
2.5 % of GDP and the economic atmosphere was 
one of relative economic stagnation. The prob-
lems facing the economy became more serious 
towards the end of the 1970s. Growth of GDP 
fluctuated between 5.7 % in 1977/78 and -10.5 % 
and 2.8 % in 1978/79 and 1979/80, respectively 
(World Bank 1985). The balance of payments 
deteriorated rapidly from US $ -470 million in 
1974/75 to US $ -750 million in 1979/80. Since 
Sudan’s exports basically depend on agricultural 
production, especially cotton, the deterioration in 
the cotton sector has obviously contributed to the 
widening deficit in the balance of payments. Ac-
cordingly, reliance on external borrowing in-
creased. The outstanding debt approached US $ 3 
billion by the end of the 1970s, while the debt 
service ratio increased to 40 per cent (World Bank 
1985).  
The external imbalance was reflected in, and also 
caused by, an internal imbalance. Current and 
development expenditure increased to 27 % of 
GDP, while the percentage of revenue to GDP fell 
to 17, thus increasing the deficit in the total 
budget to about 10 % of GDP. According to 
Shaaeldin (1986), the composition of government 
revenue was such that tax revenue accounted for 
80 % of total revenue. Taxes on international 
trade, consumption and production accounted for 
the largest proportion of tax revenue.  
The rising budget deficit led to an increasing de-
pendence on internal borrowing and reinforced 
inflationary trends. Internal borrowing from the 
Bank of Sudan increased net lending to public 
entities, with the largest proportion going to the 
public agricultural schemes. Borrowing by the 
Gezira Scheme and other similar schemes in-
creased due to low productivity and declining 
revenue. 
The performance of the economy deteriorated 
further during the 1980s (Eldaw 1999). The GDP 
growth rate was estimated at an annual average of 
1.4 %, and recorded 4 negative annual growth 
rates during the 1980s. While the annual average 
growth rate of the population (about 2.8 %) was 
higher than that of GDP, per capita GDP declined 
during the 1980s. Although agricultural GDP 
grew substantially in 1981/82, at a rate of 32 %, it 
recorded negative growth rates in 6 years of the 
1980s decade, thus recording an annual average 
growth rate of about 2.4 %. Total exports fluctu-
ated during the 1980s between US $ 333 million 
and US $ 761 million, while imports increased 
significantly during the mid-1980s. The deficit in 
the balance of payments was about US $ one bil-
lion in 1980/81. It narrowed due to heavily restric-
tive import measures to about US $ 0.5 billion in 
1988/89.  
Average annual government revenue fell during 
the 1980s to about 12 % of GDP, while average 
annual expenditure during the decade increased to 
about 19 % of GDP. The budget deficit reached 
14 % by 1989/90, resulting in increasing internal 
financing by the central bank (Abdelwahab 2001). 
On this basis, the rate of inflation increased from 
about 30 % in 1980 to about 60 % in 1989/90. 
In addition, the economic difficulties of the 1980s 
were aggravated by political and environmental 
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problems. Internal political developments intensi-
fied the civil war in the southern part of the coun-
try. This led to substantially growing expenditure. 
The political instability of the then military re-
gime increased and the regime adopted a new 
political ideology (Islamization). All these devel-
opments lead to decreasing external borrowing 
and assistance to compensate for poor export per-
formance. Consequently, Sudan failed to meet its 
debt service obligations and total external debt 
started to mount, reaching about US $13 billion 
by the mid-1980s.  
Moreover, drought conditions developing since 
the 1982 season ended with a serious production 
shortfalls and famine in 1984/85. The result was a 
food shortage. Despite substantial food assistance 
from the international community, internal politi-
cal instability intensified, ending with the national 
uprising in early 1985 against the military regime.  
Growth of GDP during 1990–1997 improved as 
compared to the situation of the 1980s (Eldaw 
1999). The growth rates of GDP in 1991/92, 
1992/93 and 1994/95 were 11.3 %, 12.3 % and 
12.7 %, respectively. This result implied a posi-
tive annual average growth in real per capita 
GDP. This improvement was effected by a recov-
ery of agricultural production. Thus, agricultural 
GDP grew by about 32 % in 1991/92 and by about 
26 % in 1992/93. Agricultural GDP growth 
amounted to an annual average of about 12 % 
from 1990/91 to 1997/98.  
However, although the growth of GDP improved, 
the other economic indicators revealed a weak 
performance of the economy. The balance of 
payments further deteriorated in the early 1990s 
as compared to the situation during the 1980s. 
Total export value fell from US $ 671 million in 
1989/90 to only US $ 374 million in 1991/92. It 
decreased further, reaching just over US $ 300 
million in both 1992/93 and 1993/94 and improv-
ing slowly to US $ 620 million in 1996/97. Total 
imports increased steadily, reaching over US $ 1.5 
billion in 1997/98, and bringing the deficit in the 
balance of payments to about US $ 1.0 billion.  
The early and mid-1990s marked a period of sig-
nificant changes in the political and economic 
environment of Sudan. The civil war escalated 
and the political impact of the first Gulf war re-
sulted in deepened isolation of Sudan. Arab finan-
cial assistance ceased and Sudan failed to meet its 
international obligations. Accumulated debt ser-
vice obligations brought total external debt to 
US $ 22.4 billion (IMF 1999). The country’s rela-
tions to the international financial institutions 
deteriorated further, leading to a near drying-up of 
international aid and credit, thus exacerbating 
domestic economic difficulties. 
In addition, fiscal performance remained weak 
during the early and mid-1990s. Expenditure in-
creased further, reaching about 31 % of GDP in 
1992/93, while government revenue decreased to 
about 9 % of GDP. The budget deficit increased to 
reach about 21 % of GDP in 1996/97. As a result, 
inflation reached about 130 % (Abdelwahab 
2001).  
In general Sudan did not achieve sustained eco-
nomic growth during the 1990s. Nevertheless, 
there are broad indications that the economy im-
proved between the late 1990s and 2001/02. The 
GDP growth rate averaged 6.6 % from 1998 
through 2001. The agricultural growth rate was up 
to about 8.5 % in 1999/00, back to less than 1 % 
in 2000/01, and amounted to about 5 % in 
2001/02.  
In addition, exports increased from about US $ 
780 million in 1999/00 to US $ 1806.7 million in 
2000/01 and to US $ 1698.7 million in 2001/02. 
The expansion of exports was due to the start of 
petroleum exports and expansion of exports of 
gold, livestock and sesame. Sudan’s exports be-
came more diversified, although exports of cotton, 
groundnuts and gum Arabic have decreased.  
In addition, the exchange rate of the Sudanese 
pound has been liberalised since 1998, and the 
spreads between official and unofficial exchange 
rates have been gradually eliminated. Also, the 
rate of inflation decreased from 130 % in 1996 to 
about 8 % in 2001 (Table 1).     
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3 Framework of National Agricultural 
Policy 
3.1 An Overall Review 
Poor performance indicators for the Sudanese 
agricultural sector during the late 1970s prompted 
the government to adopt various policies to allevi-
ate the underlying problems. These policies were 
geared to rehabilitation and restructuring of agri-
cultural production and removal of bottlenecks so 
as to improve and enhance the productive capacity 
of the sector. These policies were embodied in 
various programs implemented during the period 
from 1978 throughout the 1990s (Eldaw 1999). 
With regard to the irrigated sub-sector, the policy 
adopted during the 1980s addressed itself to reha-
bilitation of existing projects and transformation 
of production relations and marketing systems. 
The objectives of the policy were to promote ca-
pacity utilization and productivity improvement in 
order to maximize production of export crops like 
cotton and groundnuts as well as to expand import 
substitution products like wheat. The first phase of 
the rehabilitation program started in 1980/81 and 
aimed at checking deterioration of yields per fed-
dan in the Gezira Scheme and other irrigated 
schemes. Funds were earmarked for the rehabilita-
tion of infrastructure and provision of production 
inputs. In addition, the crop sharing system prac-
ticed in the irrigated sector was replaced by a wa-
ter charge and an individual account system. Re-
duction of direct and export taxes on agricultural 
products and changes in the marketing system, 
especially cotton marketing, matched these meas-
ures. 
The policies adopted in the 1990s through 2002, 
were geared to reallocation of resources in favour 
of the agricultural sector and removal of bottle-
necks so as to improve and enhance the produc-
tive capacity of the sector. The major objectives 
of these policies were liberalization of the econ-
omy in order to stimulate agricultural exports to 
generate more foreign exchange, attain self-
sufficiency and food security, and achieve finan-
cial and social stability. The major instruments of 
the liberalization policy were removal of subsidies 
on agricultural inputs, lifting of price controls and 
government regulations on agricultural products, 
reduction of subsidies, abolition of monopolies of 
marketing parastatals and withdrawal of govern-
ment financing of agricultural parastatals.  
Table 1: Indicators of Macroeconomic Performance, Sudan, 1998/99–2001/02 
 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 
GDP value (Ls million) at 1981/82 prices 
Growth rate of GDP (% p.a.) 
Share of agric. GDP in GDP 
 11730 
 
 6.0 
 48.7 
 12434 
 
 6.0 
 49.8 
 13462 
 
 8.3 
 46.4 
 14322 
 
 6.4 
 45.6 
Agric. GDP value (Ls. million) 
Growth rate of agric. GDP (% p.a.) 
 5712.0 
 8.5 
 6197.0 
 8.5 
 6244.0 
 0.8 
 6537.0 
 4.7 
Exports (US $ million) 
Imports (US $ million) 
 595.7 
 1732.2 
 780.1 
 1254.2 
 1806.7 
 1552.7 
 1698.7 
 2964.9 
Revenue (Ls billion) 
Expenditure (Ls Billion) 
Budget deficit (Ls billion) 
 1592 
 1738 
 163 
 2052 
 2270 
 218 
 3314 
 3522 
 208 
 3652 
 4188 
 536 
Inflation rate (% p.a.)  58  28  18  8 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (1999, 2000) 
 Bank of Sudan (1999, 2001) 
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3.2 Price and Trade Policies 
The major objective of policies adopted for the 
agricultural sector since independence and 
through the 1980s was to extract a surplus in 
terms of foreign exchange in the hand of govern-
ment. These policies comprised measures includ-
ing under-pricing of farm products, over-pricing 
of agricultural inputs handled by marketing boards 
as well as through various export taxes and import 
duties. Within the irrigated sector, the government 
employed its authority to establish monopolistic 
control of agricultural pricing to suppress3 farm 
gate prices of products far below levels that would 
have prevailed if a free market had been allowed 
to operate. The price control system was imple-
mented through a network of parastatal crop au-
thorities like the Cotton Public Corporation, the 
Oil Seed Company and the Agricultural Bank of 
Sudan. Typically, these authorities were given a 
complete legal monopoly over purchasing, stor-
age, processing and marketing, whether domestic 
or international, of almost all irrigated products 
except sorghum. In addition, agricultural products 
were subjected to various taxes, directly through 
export and local taxes, taxes on imported inputs, 
parastatal fees and indirectly through a complex 
system of multiple exchange rates. For wheat and 
groundnuts, explicit and implicit taxation in-
creased from 6 % to 40 % of the producer price 
and from about 7 % to 32 % for groundnuts dur-
ing the period from early 1970s to the mid-1980s, 
respectively (Abdelsalam 1987). In the case of 
cotton, taxes and other deductions had combined 
depressive effects on tenant incomes. Thus, taxes 
and duties absorbed between 42–52 % of the total 
export value of cotton during the mid-1980s and 
about 40 % of the border price equivalent of sor-
ghum during the same period (D’Silva and El-
badawi 1988). 
                                                     
3 The suppression of irrigated farm products was not 
begun by the post-independence Sudanese regimes. It 
was initiated by the colonial government, which estab-
lished the foundation for irrigated agriculture, purpose-
fully for cotton export and as a source of tax revenue and 
foreign exchange. 
The agricultural policies adopted from the 1990s 
through 2003 have mainly focused on liberalizing 
the agricultural markets. The state monopolies 
were converted into private companies and all 
forms of price controls were completely elimi-
nated. For example, the Cotton Public Corporation 
became a private company, with the Tenants’ 
Union as its main shareholder. Direct taxes on 
agricultural products were reduced to 4.2 % in 
1992/93 and then to 2.7 % in 1993/94 (Abdelwa-
hab 2001). Various regional fees and local taxes 
were also reduced. With regard to export crops, 
export taxes were reduced to 5 % for all products 
except cotton, which remained taxed at 10 % 
(Abdelwahab 2001). Import taxes for agricultural 
inputs were reduced. In addition, all forms of ex-
port and import licenses were abolished. 
Moreover, various attempts were made to adjust 
the exchange rate. In 1991, the official exchange 
rate for the dollar was increased from Ls 4.5 to Ls 
15 and the parallel rate was increased from Ls 
12.5 to Ls 30, while the free market rate stood at 
Ls 80. In 1992, the government’s initial reform 
measures were followed by additional substantial 
reform packages. Within this context, all forms of 
price controls were lifted. The multiple exchange 
rates were replaced by a unified rate, which was 
closer to the parallel market rate. The right and 
procedure involved in determining the exchange 
rate were changed. A committee of representa-
tives of commercial banks was charged with de-
termining the exchange rate, and restrictions on 
holding and transferring foreign currencies were 
eliminated. In addition, export licenses were 
eliminated and export taxes were reduced to 7.5 % 
for cotton and gum Arabic, 2 % for oil seeds and 
livestock exports and to 1 % for other agricultural 
exports. Similarly, import licenses were abolished, 
with the exception of licences for products im-
ported in the framework of trade protocols.  
3.3 Institutional Policy  
3.3.1 Production Credit 
Formal seasonal loans to the state agricultural 
corporations continued to be provided by the cen-
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tral bank (Bank of Sudan) up to the end of the 
1980s. These loans were mainly provided to fi-
nance the production of cotton and wheat, in addi-
tion to some inputs for sorghum production, 
whereas financing of groundnuts is entirely the 
responsibility of tenants. Interest rates charged for 
credit to public agricultural corporations are sub-
ject to revision in accordance with the overall 
financial policy of the government and the aver-
age interest rate prevailing in the country. The 
interest rate level increased from 6 % during the 
1960s to 8 % during the 1970s and then to 9 % 
during the 1980s.  
The total amount of credit provided by the Bank 
of Sudan to the state agricultural corporations 
amounted to Ls 187 million in 1980/81. The 
amount of this credit that was repaid was around 
Ls 150 million and the balance was added to the 
outstanding debt of Ls 180 million (Ahmed 
Humeida 1986). Between the late 1980s and early 
1990s, costs of crop production in irrigated agri-
culture increased steadily, bringing the financial 
requirements of state agricultural corporations to 
high levels. Loan repayment, however, lagged 
substantially behind the loan limits, and the out-
standing debts of the state agricultural corpora-
tions grew.  
Within the reform programs of the early 1990s, 
the credit policy aimed not only at increasing the 
volume of credit to irrigated agriculture but also at 
diversifying sources of finance and facilitating 
access to credit. However, one of the major fea-
tures of that policy was the withdrawal of gov-
ernment from financing state corporations. As a 
result, a consortium of commercial banks was 
established to finance the government agricultural 
corporations. The commercial banks were encour-
aged to establish additional branches in regional 
towns to provide wider coverage in rural areas. 
The credit ceilings of the commercial banks were 
increased and, because of high inflation levels, 
interest rates for loans were increased (Abdelwa-
hab 2001). Additional specialized banks were 
established, e.g. the Bank for Animal Resources 
and the Farmers’ Bank. As already mentioned, 
weak crop performance led to increasing tenant 
debts with the commercial banks, which as a re-
sult became reluctant to extend additional loans. 
As a consequence, the government stepped in to 
finance production in state owned agricultural 
corporations.   
3.3.2 Output and Input Marketing 
Already before independence in 1956, domestic 
and export marketing of Sudan's agricultural prod-
ucts had been almost entirely in the hand of 
indigenous and foreign private merchant capital. 
This included even the marketing of the products 
of state owned agricultural corporations like cot-
ton. While private control extended over the entire 
range of marketing operations from the farm gate 
to export delivery, the interference of government 
in the marketing systems had been limited to a 
variety of direct and indirect taxes on domestic 
and export trade. The control of the private sector 
over the agricultural marketing systems extended 
till 1969, when the state’s declared marketing 
policy assumed more control over the export mar-
ket by establishing a system of public marketing 
organizations. In 1970, the government national-
ized cotton marketing and established the CPC to 
undertake cotton export and domestic marketing 
on behalf of the government. During the same 
time, the government established the Oil Seed 
Company, OSC, and the Gum Arabic Company, 
GAC. Later on, the government established the 
Livestock and Meat Marketing Corporation, 
LMMC, to control the export market for livestock. 
The establishment of these marketing parastatals 
in the early 1970s enabled the government to exert 
full control over the export and domestic market-
ing of cotton and the export of oil seeds (ground-
nuts, sesame) and oil seed products (edible oil and 
oil seed cakes) and gum Arabic, for which it set 
the (overvalued) exchange rate. However, indige-
nous private commercial capital still retained con-
trol of the domestic marketing of traditional non-
export products in addition to minor export crops. 
The full control of the government over the whole 
cotton trade continued till 1993, when the CPC 
was transformed within the context of liberaliza-
tion policy into a private company (the SCC) and 
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sold to the Farmers’ Union (71.8 %), the Pension 
Fund (14.6 %) and the Farmers' Commercial Bank 
(13.6 %). According to the government trade pol-
icy, cotton trade transactions were settled at the 
official exchange rate, which was substantially 
overvalued. Similarly, the government decided on 
the sale of lint cotton to domestic textile mills, 
which also took place on the basis of international 
prices in US dollars. Accordingly, lint cotton was 
priced at an overvalued exchange rate. For exam-
ple, when the unified rate was about Ls 90 per 
US $ 1.0, the exchange rate used for cotton trade 
was Ls 25 per US $1.0. Thus a high margin of 
indirect tax was charged on traded cotton and 
hence producers received less in local currency 
than they would have realized at a market based 
exchange rate. The high margin of indirect tax on 
traded cotton was maintained for many years until 
it was decreased to a level of about 20 % and fi-
nally eliminated in 1998/99.  
Until the early 1970s, the distribution of cotton-
seed to oil mills was the responsibility of the Min-
istry of Industry. The ministry allocated the avail-
able quantity of cottonseed to the then existing oil 
mills according to a ratio equivalent to their de-
sign capacity. This system was changed during the 
1980s, when competition was introduced to de-
termine the ceiling price of cottonseed. In the 
early 1990s, marketing of cottonseed became the 
responsibility of the managements of irrigation 
schemes and the farmers’ unions, which otherwise 
resorted to advance sale of cottonseed because of 
financial difficulties. 
3.3.3 Research and Extension 
Agricultural research in Sudan dates back to 1902, 
when experimental cotton farms were established 
along the main Nile at Shendi and at the Blue Nile 
near Elkamlin (Hassan et al. 1986). In 1904, the 
Shambat Experimental Research Station was es-
tablished and in 1918 the Gezira Research Station 
was set up to conduct research in irrigated agricul-
ture. Subsequently, especially after independence, 
various research stations were established to con-
duct research in different fields of agriculture, 
livestock and forestry. In 1967, the ARC was cre-
ated through merger and reorganization of various 
research stations under one umbrella. The man-
date of the ARC covers the whole of Sudan 
through a network of research stations and cen-
tres.  
Besides the ARC, the Agricultural Research 
Council, one of five specialized research councils 
of the National Research Council, the NRC, influ-
ences agricultural research by financing individu-
als, institutions and multidisciplinary teams to 
undertake research in areas not attended to by the 
ARC. All these institutions are state owned and 
are dedicated to undertaking applied research in 
line with state interests. Till very recently, the 
ARC was a subordinate institution of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, with an appointed Board of Direc-
tors which decided upon the broad lines of re-
search policy for the ARC. The Minister of Agri-
culture appointed the director of the ARC. The 
Board of Directors and the Director of the ARC 
were both accountable to the Minister of Agricul-
ture. Based on this, agricultural research has been 
in line with government interests. As a result field 
crops, the diversification and intensification of 
which have been the major objective of the gov-
ernment, have dominated research interest. Re-
cently, policy makers felt the need for a coordi-
nated multidisciplinary team approach to effec-
tively tackle the problems affecting the agricul-
tural sector.  
The government finances the annual budget of the 
ARC and all agricultural research activities and 
provides budgets for the purchase of equipment 
and research material, in addition to provision of 
annual budgets for staff training at various levels. 
In addition, in previous years the ARC has re-
ceived technical and financial support from out-
side in the framework of joint research projects 
and/or special programs aimed at building re-
search capacity and maintaining built capacities. 
Similarly, various agricultural institutions like the 
Gezira Scheme, for example, have contributed, 
through provision of research costs, to the conti-
nuity of the ARC's research activities. However, 
in consequence of the political developments in 
Sudan, technical and financial support from out-
side started to decline in the early 1980s and fi-
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nally ceased during the early 1990s. Similarly, 
government support for equipment, research mate-
rial and staff training as well as financial support 
for agricultural schemes declined, taking on a 
sporadic and ad hoc character during the 1990s. 
The consequences of such developments have 
been stagnation of research activities and discon-
tinuity of technology development, in addition to 
brain drain and lack of capacity building. 
4 The Gezira Scheme: Organisation, 
Infrastructure, Services 
The Gezira Scheme lies south of Khartoum be-
tween the Blue and White Niles (Map 1). At the 
time of its establishment in 1925, the total original 
area of the Scheme was about 1.135 million fed-
dans. In the early 1960s, the original area was 
extended to the southwest to include the so-called 
Managil Extension, so that the scheme’s total area 
under irrigation was brought up to 2.1 million 
feddans (882,000 hectares). 
Since its establishment, the Gezira Scheme has 
experienced many changes. The Sudan Gezira 
Board replaced the former managing Sudan Plan-
tation Syndicate in 1950. Production relations 
have undergone several modifications. The joint 
account system was modified in 1946, 1950 and 
in 1970, and was replaced by the individual ac-
count system in 1980/81 (Appendix 1). In addi-
tion, crop production was intensified and diversi-
fied by the introduction of groundnuts as a cash 
crop and wheat as an import substitute as well as 
by the expansion of vegetable cultivation. In the 
early 1980s, plans were made to introduce fodder 
cultivation as a basis for the integration of live-
stock production into the scheme’s cropping sys-
tem. All these developments lead to many changes 
of the cropping rotation adopted (see Table 2). 
4.1 Structural Organization 
4.1.1 Land Tenure 
Arrangements for endorsement of land ownership 
existed in the Gezira area already before the estab-
lishment of the Gezira Scheme. With the advent 
of the irrigation system, legislation was passed to 
avoid speculation and to prevent sale of land to 
non-inhabitants (Awad 1987).  
In establishing the Gezira Scheme, the govern-
ment either bought or leased land from its owners 
under the 1921 Gezira Land Ordinance. As a re-
sult, up to 40 % resp. 60 % of the existing land of 
the Gezira Scheme is under tenant and govern-
ment ownership. The privately owned land was 
leased to the government on a compulsory basis 
for a fixed annual rate of Ls 0.10 per feddan for 
40 years4. Finally, land allotments of farms (ten-
ancies) of 15 or 30 feddans, called hawashas, were 
made according to the size of land owned, and 
landowners became tenants.  
Priority in allocation of tenancies was given first 
of all to title-holders. Landowners in possession of 
large landholdings (more than 80 feddans) were 
also allotted a 30 feddan tenancy, but, in addition, 
they were also given the right to nominate others 
to be tenants. The reason for this was that the 
Gezira Land Ordinance of 1921 specifies that 
farmers were not allowed to own more than one 
tenancy. Therefore, landowners with large hold-
ings nominated family members (including sons, 
wives, daughters and other relatives), and where 
there were no nominees, the tenancies were allot-
ted to other inhabitants. In 1934, the size of the 
standard tenancies was increased to 20 and 40 
feddans. This upscaling was necessitated by the 
introduction of the then 8-course rotation, which 
aimed at combating the outbreak of plant diseases 
that occurred in 1933. 
                                                     
4 In 1965, when rent contracts expired, landowners raised 
claims to  negotiate a new agreement; nevertheless, the 
whole issue remained pending. 
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The same procedure of tenancy allotment was 
adopted for the Managil Extension. However, the 
standard holding for tenants were smaller, i.e. 15 
and 30 feddans, respectively.  
The Gezira Land Ordinance of 1921 specifies, 
also, that farmers may not sell, rent or sublet their 
tenancies. A tenancy can be inherited, but offi-
cially it can only be broken down into half the size 
of a full tenancy. 
As a result the present rigid land tenure system of 
the Gezira Scheme represents a source of ineffi-
ciency of resource allocation, both for the tenants 
and from a national perspective. The ban on sale 
of tenancies limits the options for aggregation of 
land to increase tenancy sizes to sizes that provide 
enough income under present producer price ra-
tios and cost of living conditions. 
4.1.2 Production Relations 
The Gezira Scheme was established as a parastatal 
enterprise under which production is a joint re-
sponsibility of the government, the British com-
pany (Sudan Plantation Syndicate) and the ten-
ants. The backbone of this triple relationship is the 
tenancy agreement, which, in essence, governs the 
obligations and rights of the three parties concern-
ing the production of cotton and the sharing of its 
net proceeds. Within the context of the tenancy 
agreement, the government is responsible for in-
put provision, supply of irrigation water and 
financing of cotton production. The Gezira Board, 
on the other hand, is responsible for administra-
tion and provision of central management as well 
as mechanized work (ploughing, sowing, spray-
ing, maintenance of irrigation infrastructure), and 
the tenants are responsible for the whole of cotton 
Map 1: The Gezira Scheme 
 
Source: Brandt et al. (1987) 
 A.M. Eldaw 
 
12
cultivation operations, including picking. After 
deduction of certain cotton production costs that 
are regarded as joint collective charges5, the net 
proceeds are divided among the tenants, the gov-
ernment and the Gezira Board according to the 
rules of a joint account system (see Table 2). Pro-
duction of other products like lubia, sorghum and, 
later on, groundnuts was not part of the tenancy 
agreement. The tenants are entirely responsible 
for financing, producing and marketing these 
products. However, tenants pay no water charges 
or taxes for the production of these products. 
Unlike these products, wheat was considered as a 
strategic product since its introduction in the early 
1970s and was, therefore, financed and marketed 
by the Gezira Board. 
The joint account system was abolished in 
1980/81 and replaced by the individual account 
system. Under the new system, the tenants pay the 
costs of all inputs provided by the Gezira Board 
for the production of cotton as well as other crops. 
However, while the Gezira Board has no control 
over the proceeds of crops other than cotton, all 
irrigation, input and service costs borne by the 
government or the Board are recovered from the 
proceeds of cotton sales. This arrangement, how-
ever, contributed to the emergence of an economic 
bias against cotton husbandry. As a result, tenants 
tended not only to allocate the resources under 
their control (labour in particular) away from cot-
ton in the direction of their own marketable crops, 
but also to divert inputs specified for cotton (for 
example fertilizer) for use with other crops.  
4.1.3 The Cropping System 
Based on the tenancy agreement, decisions on 
crop choice, crop mix and crop rotation are the 
domain of the Gezira Board. The Agricultural 
Committee (a sub-committee of the Board of Di-
rectors) is the body that makes decisions on crop 
rotation, though with technical support from the 
                                                     
5 The joint charges include: cost of seed, fertilizers, spray-
ing, advances for cotton picking, transportation, ginning, 
storage, marketing and insurance. 
Gezira Research Station. These decisions extend 
to specifying the volume and quality of applied 
inputs and the timing of various agricultural ac-
tivities, especially with regard to cotton. Once the 
Gezira Board approves these decisions, they have 
the character of law. 
The initial crop mix in the Gezira Scheme in-
cluded, besides cotton as a major crop, sorghum 
and lubia (dolichos lablab). These crops were 
grown in a three-course rotation: cotton – sor-
ghum/lubia – fallow. The crop mix and crop rota-
tion were subjected to various changes for techni-
cal and economic reasons in the course of time 
between the early 1930s and the early 2000s (see 
Table 2). Although cotton remained the main crop 
throughout, wheat, groundnuts and sorghum have 
become important crops since the late 1960s. 
The first change of crop rotation took place in 
1932/33 to extend the fallow area in order to 
combat the then heavy infestation of cotton with 
the devastating black arm disease. At the begin-
ning of the era of the Sudan Gezira Board, which 
replaced the expatriate Plantation Syndicates in 
1950, an eight-course rotation was established. 
The biggest change in crop rotation was effected 
by the diversification policy, which was intro-
duced during the 1960s. Accordingly, rotation was 
revised to accommodate wheat, groundnuts and 
phillipesara (a legume fodder). When the Managil 
Extension was established, it started with a six-
course rotation. Following the intensification pol-
icy in 1975/76, a unified four-course rotation was 
adopted all over the irrigated area. This rotation 
was expanded in the early 1980s to a five-course 
rotation to accommodate a fodder break in an 
attempt to integrate livestock production in the 
Scheme area.  
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The total cultivable area of the Gezira scheme is 
divided up into 90-feddan fields known as num-
bers. According to crop rotation, each of these 
fields will be under different crops in the succes-
sion of years corresponding to the number of 
crops and fallows in the rotation. Each number is 
in turn divided into equal plots, each of which 
belongs to one tenant, and on which he cultivates 
one of his crops in the specified rotation, or a fal-
low plot is inserted. Based on that, under the cur-
rently adopted four-course rotation in the Main 
Gezira, a tenant will have his plot of cotton or any 
other crop along with other tenants in one number, 
so that the number will be entirely under one crop 
or fallow. 
The need to abide by the rules imposed by a spe-
cific rotation limits tenant land allocation choices. 
Accordingly, the uniform crop rotation affects 
tenant costs and financial situation substantially.  
4.2 Infrastructure 
The infrastructure available within the Gezira 
Scheme includes the land, the canalisation system, 
machinery and equipment, in addition to build-
ings, transportation infrastructure and vehicles. 
The value of this infrastructure constitutes a cru-
cial dimension of the importance of the Scheme. 
Unfortunately, there has been no formal valuation 
of this infrastructure. However, rough estimates 
suggest the value of infrastructure within the 
Scheme to amount to US $ 8 billion6.  
                                                     
6 Including the value of dams and main canals. 
Table 2: Development of Planned Crop Rotation in the Gezira Scheme 
Season Crop rotation Land use intensitya 
Main Gezira: 
1925/26 – 1930/31 
1931/32 – 1932/33 
1933/34 – 1960/61 
1961/62 – 1974/75 
1975/76 – 1980/81 
1981/82 - onwards 
Managil Extension: 
1933/34 – 1960/61 
1961/62 – 1974/75 
1975/76 - 1980/81 
1981/82 – onwards 
 
C – S/Lb – F 
C – F – F 
C – F – F – C – F – S – L/F – F 
C – W – F – C – G/L – S - P/F – F 
C – W – G/S – F 
C – W – G/S – F – F 
 
C – S – L/F 
C – W – C – G/L – S - P/F 
C – W – G/S – F 
C – W – G/S – F – F 
 
66.30 
33.30 
44.75 
69.75 
75.00 
75.00 
 
44.75 
69.75 
100.00 
75.00 
C = cotton; F = fallow; Fo = fodder; G = groundnuts; L = lubia;  
P = phillipisara;  S = sorghum; W = wheat   
a This denotes the ratio of cropped land to total irrigated area 
b Cultivation of sorghum or lubia or a combination of them 
Source: Galal, M. Y. (1997) 
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4.2.1 Irrigation Infrastructure 
4.2.1.1 Supply of Irrigation Water 
Except for an area of about 70,000 feddans7 of the 
total command area of the Gezira Scheme, most 
of the Scheme is irrigated by gravity irrigation. 
The Scheme is supplied with irrigation water from 
the Sennar and Roseires Dams on the Blue Nile. 
The annual water discharge of the Blue Nile is 
estimated at an average of about 50 billion cubic 
meters measured at Roseires (Ahmed 2000). 
However, this flow is characterized by heavy an-
nual and seasonal variations. Thus, it rises steeply 
from the end of June to a maximum peak at the 
end of August, in order to decline sharply to a 
minimum of about 2 % of the peak at the end of 
April. Based on the Nile water agreement between 
Sudan and Egypt, Sudan’s share amounts to 18.5 
billion cubic meters. As already mentioned, the 
Gezira Scheme utilizes about 35 % of this share. 
Water storage at the reservoirs of the Sennar and 
Roseires dams starts in early September, after the 
flood period, when the daily water discharge of 
the Blue Nile declines to the level of 350 million 
cubic meters (Ahmed 2000). The reason for this 
arrangement is to restrict the deposition of silt in 
the reservoirs to a minimum. The reservoirs are 
normally filled within 45 days. The designed stor-
age capacity of the Sennar reservoir is 930 million 
cubic meters and that of Roseires is 3.024 million 
cubic meters. Water withdrawal for irrigation 
from the two reservoirs commences in December, 
with the two reservoirs operated as one combined 
reservoir. 
4.2.1.2 The Irrigation Network 
Irrigation water is delivered to the Scheme’s areas 
through a network of canals covering the whole 
area. The network consists of 194 kilometres of 
                                                     
7 Most of this area lies on the eastern bank of the Blue 
Nile (Hurga and Nur Eldin Blocks), in addition to a 
small area in Hag Abdallah Block (Southern Gezira), 
which is irrigated by pumps for topographic reasons. 
Main Canals, 2300 kilometres of Major Canals 
and 8000 kilometres of Minor Canals (Galal 
1997). Water is conveyed to the irrigated areas of 
the Scheme through 2 main canals (Gezira and 
Managil Main Canals) converging from the reser-
voir at Sennar. The two canals run 57 kilometres 
northward of the dam to a group of regulators, 
where the Managil Main Canal branches into four 
canals (Major Canals), which convey irrigation 
water to the Managil Extension. The Gezira Main 
Canal runs further northward for another 137 
kilometres, and branches into many Major Canals 
to irrigate the various areas of the Main Gezira. 
The major canals branch in turn into Minor Ca-
nals, which convey the irrigation water through 
gated field outlet pipes to field ditches called Abu 
Ishreens. Every Abu Ishreen irrigates 90 feddans 
(Number) through 9 Abu Sitas. Each Abu Sita 
irrigates a field of 10 feddans.  
The two main canals were designed to convey a 
daily maximum of 31.5 million cubic meters. Wa-
ter flow in the network is continuous, especially 
during the irrigation season (July-April). Assum-
ing no or minimum transit losses, the irrigation 
network is in the position to provide a monthly 
average of between 930–960 million cubic meters 
of irrigation water to the overall area. This amount 
is equivalent to a monthly average of about 450 
cubic meters per feddan (110 mm/ha, month). 
The only sources of water losses from the irriga-
tion system of the Gezira Scheme are evaporation 
and breakage of canals. Water losses within the 
irrigation network are virtually negligible, because 
of the impermeable nature of the soil and subsoil, 
which does not allow irrigation water to percolate 
as deep as the groundwater table. 
Besides the canalisation system, the irrigation 
network of the Gezira Scheme comprises a drain-
age system consisting of 1500 kilometres of major 
drains and about 6000 kilometres of minor drains. 
The major purpose of this drainage system is to 
siphon up surface runoff due to rain or excess 
irrigation.  
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4.2.1.3 Water Delivery and Distribution 
The requirements of irrigation water are calcu-
lated at the beginning of each cropping season by 
field inspectors for each minor canal. These re-
quirements are transmitted to the Division Water 
Engineers, who calculate the water requirements 
for the various reaches of the canals up to the 
dam. The minor canals were designed to store the 
water flowing during the night, so that irrigation 
can be undertaken during the daylight hours. The 
overall control of water movement from the dam 
up to the minor canals is regulated by various 
control structures operated by personnel of the 
Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources, 
MOIWR. Gezira Scheme personnel operate the 
release of water from the minor canal to Abu 
Ishreen, while release of water from Abu Ishreen 
to Abu Sita and its control within the field is the 
responsibility of the tenant.  
The expansion of the Gezira Scheme’s area in 
early 1960s (Managil Extension) and the intensifi-
cation and diversification of crop production in 
the mid 1960s, prompted the use of water distribu-
tion practices other than those used before. First, 
these developments required an increasing volume 
of water to be released at the dam into the system. 
Accordingly, total water flow from the dam in-
creased from 2 billion cubic meters before 1960 to 
about 7.1 billion cubic meters afterwards. As a 
result of this expansion, more silt is carried to the 
system, since the expansion of the cultivated area 
water release has been diverted earlier than be-
fore, when the water still carries more silt. Sec-
ond, to distribute the increased water require-
ments, the irrigation system must be operated at a 
capacity higher than is was designed for. 
4.2.1.4 Irrigation Management 
Until 1995, the management of the irrigation net-
work and irrigation practices in the Gezira 
Scheme was a joint responsibility of and between 
the MOIWR and the Gezira Scheme. The Ministry 
of Irrigation was in charge of the maintenance of 
the irrigation network, with budgets allotted by 
the government. The Gezira Board was responsi-
ble for water management in the minor canals up 
to the field level, with a budget borne by the joint 
account system. When the shift to the individual 
account system was introduced, the budget for the 
maintenance of the irrigation system was raised 
from the water charges paid by tenants. However, 
problems in collecting water charges from tenants 
led to further difficulties, namely in securing the 
required budget with the Ministry of Irrigation in 
order to undertake the desired maintenance works. 
Following these problems, the responsibility for 
collecting water charges from tenants and operat-
ing and maintaining the irrigation system in the 
Gezira Scheme was transferred in 1995 to a finan-
cially independent parastatal, the Irrigation Water 
Corporation, IWC. However, the IWC, too, failed 
in managing the irrigation water in the Gezira, as 
did other similar schemes, because of financial 
difficulties due to problems of cost recovery for 
irrigation water. Therefore, the management of 
irrigation water in the minor canals up to the field 
level were made the responsibility of the Gezira 
Scheme. The Gezira Scheme also became respon-
sible for collection of water rates and maintenance 
of the irrigation infrastructure from the minor 
canals down to the field level.  
The difficulties of water cost recovery encoun-
tered by the IWC and later by the Gezira Scheme 
included adequate silt cleaning operations. In ad-
dition, the expansion in irrigation water require-
ments overloaded the designed capacity of the 
canalisation system, thus leading to continuous 
breakage and water losses. Moreover, due to lack 
of financial resources most of the canal regulators 
and structures have not received adequate mainte-
nance and therefore their efficiency has widely 
deteriorated. As a result, water delivery became 
difficult at varying times and regions within the 
irrigated area. Reduced numbers and volumes of 
irrigations per crop and untimely irrigation prac-
tices became the rule, thus leading to declining 
crop yields and hence declining tenant and 
scheme income. 
In appreciation of this problem, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Gezira Board and other stake-
holders of the Gezira Scheme have persistently 
searched for solutions. Various committees and 
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study missions, including missions from the 
World Bank, have contributed to solving the prob-
lem of water management in the Gezira Scheme 
and other similar irrigation schemes. Most of the 
local consultants and decision makers in the Min-
istry of Irrigation, Ministry of Agriculture and the 
Gezira Board attribute the problem of water man-
agement to the financial shortages resulting from 
inadequate recovery of water costs and, in the last 
instance, low payment for irrigation water. Based 
on that, they propose resorting to the original sys-
tem of joint water management by the Ministry of 
Irrigation and the Gezira Board and ensuring ade-
quate provision of financial resources by strength-
ening the means of water cost recovery and revis-
ing water costs. The consultants from the World 
Bank attribute the water management problem to 
institutional problems and propose the establish-
ment of Water User Groups, WUG, at the block 
level and transfer of the overall responsibility for 
water management to the WUGs. Thus far the 
argumentation of Sudanese organizations and the 
World Bank has tended to neglect the grossly 
deteriorated economy of tenants.  
The water management problem, especially in an 
irrigation enterprise like the Gezira Scheme, is not 
merely a technical problem, as it is seen by the 
authorities of the Ministry of Irrigation, nor pri-
marily an institutional problem, as it is seen by the 
World Bank and FAO authorities. As already 
mentioned, the irrigation network of the Gezira 
Scheme is extensive and the management of irri-
gation operations at any level of the network 
represents a constraint for the other levels. As 
such, the technical efficiency of the system calls 
for amalgamation of management responsibility 
under one authority which is technically capable 
of managing maintenance and future improve-
ments. Responsibility for management of the sys-
tem at any level is technically far beyond the ca-
pacity of the tenant Water User Groups. Manage-
ment by WUGs would be difficult even though 
technical experts support the WUGs; this would 
mean a need for cooperation among over 100 
WUGs8 across the scheme’s area, to say nothing 
of cooperation among the around 1000 tenants in 
one WUG9. 
4.2.2 Agricultural Engineering 
The Gezira Board has a fleet of agricultural ma-
chinery under the supervision of the Department 
of Agricultural Engineering, DAE, which is in 
charge of various agricultural operations. These 
operations include cleaning and maintenance of 
Abu Ishreen canals, land preparation for cotton 
and wheat, application of pre-emergence herbi-
cides and pesticides, broadcasting of fertilizers, 
harvesting of wheat and sorghum and threshing of 
groundnuts. 
The DAE operates a fleet which currently com-
prises some 468 wheel-tractors of various sizes, 
105 crawlers (for deep ploughing) and over 50 
combine harvesters, in addition to a large array of 
agricultural implements (Galal 1997). 
The DAE is centrally organized, with its head-
quarters at Barakat and three substations with 
central workshops in Maringan, Hasahiesa and 
24-Gorashi. The machinery is operated on a team 
basis to accomplish the various work assignments 
in the different areas of the Scheme according to 
plans set by the DAE headquarters. The respective 
field inspectors in the different blocks define the 
magnitude and quality of the various agricultural 
operations to be undertaken. The levels of fees to 
be paid by the tenants for the various mechanical 
operations are set by the DAE and approved by 
the Gezira Board. Owing to the financial difficul-
ties experienced by the Gezira Scheme since the 
early 1990s, there was a marked drop in the vol-
ume and quality of work accomplished by the 
DAE. In an attempt to increase its efficiency, the 
                                                     
8 If the WUGs are established at the block level, this will 
lead to the creation of about 100 WUGs because there 
are about 103 blocks in the Gezira Scheme. 
9 If there are about 100 WUGs, each of them will be com-
posed of about 1000 tenants, the total number of tenants 
being about 110000. 
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DAE was given commercial status (although it 
remained the property of the Gezira Board). 
Despite that, the volume of work accomplished by 
the DAE is estimated to reach, on average, some 
30 % of the planned/necessary volume of the 
work that needs to be done. The rest of the 
mechanized work is usually contracted out to the 
private sector at the same approved rates which 
are charged to tenants for DAE services through 
individual tenant accounts. Financial difficulties 
have impeded the provision of spare parts and the 
maintenance and overhauling of machinery re-
quired for it to be capable of a higher percentage 
of work. In addition, there is increasing dissatis-
faction among tenants about the quality of work 
performed by the DAE and the levels of fees and 
costs charged. 
4.2.3 The Cotton Ginneries 
The Department of Cotton Ginneries of the Gezira 
Scheme operates 12 ginneries located in three 
stations (Maringan, Hasahiesa and Bagair). The 
Scheme's first ginneries date back to 1921. Addi-
tional ginneries were introduced in 1929, 1954, 
1960, 1964 and 1972. Most of these ginneries 
have been renovated to varying degrees and some 
of them have been converted to suit the quality of 
the cotton cultivated. 
All the cotton produced in the Gezira Scheme is 
ginned and packed in bales before being trans-
ported to Port Sudan for shipment for export. The 
costs of ginning and packing materials are de-
ducted from tenant cotton sales through the indi-
vidual accounting system. Although there is no 
shortage in the capacity of available ginneries, 
their operation has become a challenge in view of 
their age and spare parts requirements. In addi-
tion, difficulties in providing a continuous supply 
of electric power pose even more problems for the 
efficiency of the ginneries. Thus, the constraints 
currently facing the ginneries relate basically to 
their technical and economic efficiency.  
4.2.4 Transportation Infrastructure 
The major transportation infrastructure of the 
Gezira Scheme consists of the Gezira Light Rail-
way, GLR. The first rail route was established in 
1919 and had a rail length of 20 km. Subsequent 
expansion of the railway took place in 1950s to 
about 300 km, and was then continued with the 
establishment of Managil Extension, so that cur-
rently the total length of the railway network 
amounts to 1200 km. This railway network covers 
about 75 % of the Scheme. It connects 120 cotton 
collection stations, which are organized at 54 ad-
ministrative points across the irrigated area. The 
hauling power of the GLR consists of 62 locomo-
tives and 1841 railway wagons. However, the 
number of operational locomotives and rolling 
stock is seriously depleted, due to inadequate 
maintenance and shortage of spare parts.  
Besides the GLR, the Gezira Scheme makes use 
of the triangle of asphalted tarmac roads connect-
ing Khartoum–Kosti, Khartoum–Sennar and 
Kosti–Sennar. In addition, there is an intensive 
network of roads within the Scheme’s area, con-
necting almost all towns and villages within the 
irrigated area. This network is composed of the 
roads along the canal system, which partly repre-
sent the main roads between the towns within the 
Gezira area and the secondary roads connecting 
the towns to the adjacent villages. Nevertheless, 
except for two roads connecting Medani to Man-
agil (about 60 km) and Hasahiesa to Fireigab (50 
km), all of the roads and tracks within the irri-
gated area are unsurfaced dirt roads, which be-
come impassable during the rainy season. 
The Gezira Scheme uses its rail network to trans-
port seed cotton from the collection centres to the 
ginneries and to deliver agricultural inputs such as 
fertilizers, seeds, herbicides and sacks to the 
fields. The transportation capacity of the GLR is 
currently reduced to about 30 % of the Gezira 
Scheme’s transportation demand. Privately owned 
and operated trucks undertake the rest of transpor-
tation. Transportation of cotton from the ginneries 
to Port Sudan and imported inputs from Port Su-
dan to the Gezira Scheme is undertaken by the 
private sector. However, the Gezira Scheme coor-
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dinates its respective operations with the private 
transporters and deducts the costs incurred 
through the individual accounts of the tenants. 
4.2.5 Other Infrastructure 
The Gezira Scheme operates four workshops that 
undertake the various maintenance operations, 
including rehabilitation of GLR locomotives as 
well as other engines. In addition, they manufac-
ture some spare parts for the ginneries and per-
form repairs on farm equipment as well as many 
other metal–working jobs. Also, the Gezira 
Scheme has a department for telecommunication, 
which operates a network of telephones covering 
the whole area of the scheme. In addition, the 
scheme possesses a fleet of vehicles of various 
makes for the use of field inspectors and extension 
workers. Most of the vehicles are obsolete mod-
els. Overload work, under the climatic conditions 
and road quality of the Gezira Scheme, as well as 
lack of spare parts and regular inspection and 
services have contributed to the deterioration of 
these vehicles.  
In sum, it may be concluded that while the Gezira 
Scheme appears to be in possession of the basic 
infrastructure required for irrigation of this size, 
this entire infrastructure has deteriorated very 
much due to poor management resulting from the 
financial difficulties that have faced and still face 
the Gezira Scheme. The contribution of the dete-
rioration of this infrastructure to the unsatisfactory 
production performance of the scheme cannot be 
overlooked. A huge enterprise like the Gezira 
Scheme cannot be operated without an integrated 
set of infrastructure that can provide the basis for 
management of improved production. Accord-
ingly, rehabilitation of the available infrastructure 
represents a cornerstone of any strategy for sus-
tainable development in the Gezira Scheme. 
Within this context, however, it must be deter-
mined to what extent some components of the 
infrastructure could be managed by the private 
sector.   
4.2.6 Institutional Services 
Based on the tenancy agreement, the Gezira Board 
is principally responsible for the central manage-
ment of crop production, especially cotton 
production and, later on, wheat production. In 
complying with this task, the Gezira Board 
provides various services, like land preparation, 
supply of inputs as well as processing and 
transport of output, in addition to coordination of 
other operations performed by private institutions, 
like aerial spraying of insecticides, land 
preparation and mechanical crop harvesting. 
Moreover, the Gezira Board provides essential 
services like credit and product marketing. 
4.2.6.1 Institutional Credit 
Based on the tenancy agreement, the Gezira Board 
provides almost all the services and inputs for the 
production and marketing of cotton. The same 
credit arrangements for cotton were applied simi-
larly to wheat production after its introduction in 
the early 1970s. Before the 1990s, all of the ser-
vices and inputs provided were financed by the 
government (the central bank) and administered 
by the Gezira Board. The government also deter-
mines the interest rates charged for these loans. 
Up to the early 1990s, the interest rates charged 
stood at the level of 9 % (Galal 1997). The inputs 
and services supplied include seed, sacks, fertiliz-
ers and chemicals for plant protection, in addition 
to land preparation, application of fertilizers and 
spraying of chemicals. In addition, the Gezira 
Board finances the mechanical harvesting of 
wheat and provides cash advances, especially for 
cotton picking as well as for its cultivation and 
weeding. However, these cash advances have 
historically been below the actual costs incurred 
by tenants for the various farming activities (Ma-
gar 1987). Tenants are, therefore confronted with 
the problem of securing additional cash loans to 
cover the labour costs incurred for various agri-
cultural practices. Many tenants are, for various 
reasons, not in the position to obtain break-even 
yields. For those tenants, payment of cash ad-
vances is deferred, in an attempt to avoid build-up 
of tenant debt.  
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With regard to other crops, the overall production 
process associated with these crops is the respon-
sibility of tenants. Given the lack of formal 
sources of finance in the Gezira, many scholars 
have reported that a large percentage of tenants 
are reliant on informal credit facilities, especially 
the so-called shail system, with its alleged high 
cost of finance (Magar 1987; Ahmed Humeida 
1987; Hassan 1993; Galal 1997). Since the cost of 
finance acquired through informal channels (shail) 
is relatively high, many tenants resorting to in-
formal financial sources are forced further into 
debt. The immediate outcome of such problems 
has been an increasing tendency on the part of 
tenants to sub-leasing land and make crop sharing 
arrangements.  
The credit arrangements for the Gezira Scheme 
remained unchanged after the implementation of 
the liberalization policy in early 1990s. The 
Gezira Board continued to administer loans that 
continued to be provided by the government for 
cotton and wheat. However, the credit require-
ments of the Gezira Scheme increased substan-
tially in the early 1990s due to the implementation 
of the liberalization policy. The deteriorating bal-
ance of payments and weak fiscal performance, in 
addition to fading external finance, led to rampant 
inflation that resulted in a substantial expansion of 
the amount of finance required (Abdelwahab 
2001). This situation prompted the government to 
resort to an alternative credit policy by establish-
ing a Consortium of Commercial Banks in 1993 to 
provide the finance required for the Gezira 
Scheme.  
However, weak agricultural performance impeded 
the recovery of loans and interest by the commer-
cial banks for many years. As a result, the indebt-
edness of tenants grew and the financers became 
reluctant to continue providing the required loans, 
a fact that forced the government to resume fi-
nancing the production of the Gezira Scheme. 
While government sources were not in the posi-
tion to cover the finance required, the Gezira 
Board sought alternative sources of finance. Ac-
cordingly, the Sudan Cotton Company became 
involved in securing finance for the Gezira 
Scheme through the advance sale of cotton, in 
addition to the commercial banks, which resumed 
financing of the scheme under new regulations for 
repayment.  
4.2.6.2 Agricultural Marketing 
In the initial phases of the Gezira Scheme, export 
and domestic marketing of all crops was under-
taken by the private sector. In 1970, the govern-
ment nationalized the Cotton Marketing Company 
and assumed control of export and domestic mar-
keting of cotton through the newly established 
Cotton Public Corporation, CPC. Tenant respon-
sibility ends with harvesting, sacking and delivery 
of the crop to the nearest collection centre. The 
Gezira Board provides for transportation of the 
crop to the ginneries, processing of the crop and 
transportation of the lint cotton to the warehouses 
of the CPC in Port Sudan before export shipment.  
The CPC bought all the seed cotton produced in 
the Gezira Scheme and elsewhere, on behalf of 
the government at prices fixed at the ginnery gate. 
These prices were based on annual world prices of 
cotton fob Port Sudan, less the cost of ginning, 
transportation of lint cotton to Port Sudan and 
other relevant charges. The prices of cotton lint 
for the local textile industry were also based on 
export prices adjusted for transportation to Port 
Sudan and export costs. The CPC deducted its 
marketing costs from cotton proceeds and the 
balance in Sudanese currency was delivered to the 
Gezira Board to pay the tenants after deduction of 
their respective production costs and charges. All 
cotton seed is distributed locally by the Ministry 
of Industry through a quota system to the oil mills 
at prices fixed annually at the ginnery gate.  
In 1993, the CPC was transformed within the con-
text of the liberalization policy into a private com-
pany (the Sudan Cotton Company; SCC) and sold 
to shareholders, including the Farmers’ Union, the 
Pension Fund and the Farmers Commercial Bank. 
Under the new institutional arrangement, the SCC 
undertakes the same export procedures for cotton 
on behalf of tenants. The SCC deducts the costs 
incurred to export the cotton, in addition to 1 % of  
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the gross value of exported cotton as company 
fees.  
As regards wheat marketing, up to the early 
1990s, tenants were obliged to deliver their har-
vest to authorized wheat mills at procurement 
prices fixed by the Gezira Board. However, there 
was an unofficial market for wheat, where the 
prevailing prices were much higher than those 
fixed by the government. Currently, after the im-
plementation of the liberalization policy, tenants 
are no longer obliged to deliver their wheat to the 
Gezira Board. 
As to sorghum and groundnuts, there have been 
no official marketing arrangements. However, 
with increasing failure of the tenants to pay for 
water and administration costs, the Gezira Board 
arranges, at harvest time, for delivery of an im-
puted quantity of produce that is equivalent in 
value to the costs to be covered. The same proce-
dure applies for wheat. The Gezira Board fixes the 
prices at which these products are delivered based 
on estimates made by its officials. These prices 
are at all times much higher than the prevailing 
market prices for these products.  
4.2.7 Agricultural Technology 
4.2.7.1 Agricultural Research 
Technology development for crop management 
and production in the Gezira Scheme is the re-
sponsibility of the Gezira Research Station, GRS, 
which was originally established in 1918 to serve 
the Gezira Scheme. During the 1960s, the GRS 
was affiliated with the Agricultural Research Cor-
poration, ARC. The GRS is relatively well 
equipped and has a well-trained research staff, 
especially with respect to the technical aspects of 
agricultural production. Appropriate research fa-
cilities in the previous years enabled GRS staff to 
develop suitable production technologies for the 
Gezira Scheme. The impact of these technologies 
was particularly pronounced as to breeding of new 
varieties, improvement of crop yields and control 
of insects, plant diseases and weeds. 
In addition, the Gezira Scheme cooperates with 
other ARC research centres specialized in activi-
ties of interest to the Gezira Scheme. It can clearly 
be stated that the Gezira Scheme has capacities to 
develop technology for improved crop production.  
4.2.7.2 Extension Service 
The Gezira Scheme's department of extension 
services is relatively young and small. Thus, since 
the establishment of the Scheme, field inspectors 
have performed extension service activities simul-
taneously with their other responsibilities. In 
1969, expert extension services were introduced 
to the Scheme in selected Blocks10 and finally one 
position of extension officer was established in 
each of the 18 Groups of the Scheme (Galal 
1997). The ratio of extension officers (field in-
spectors not counted) to tenants stands at 1:7000 
(World Bank 2000). The activities performed by 
extension officers include dissemination of infor-
mation about new products, improved crop varie-
ties and animal breeds, effective methods of input 
use and application, improved crop and animal 
husbandry practices and basic knowledge about 
crop protection and animal hygiene. For the dis-
semination of this information, the extension offi-
cers use means that include organization of field 
days and field and village visits, in addition to the 
use of radio and television.  
The structure of extension services on Group basis 
was abolished in 1996 and instead 300 field 
inspectors were assigned with extension work, 
thus increasing the ratio of extension officers 
substantially to 1:400. The functions attended by 
the extension officers were broadened to include 
training of field inspectors and tenants on relevant 
subject matters, while the means of communica-
tion were extended to include the use of Farmers’ 
Field Schools. 
                                                     
10 The five Blocks are Elkumur, Abdel Hakam, El Madina 
Arab, El Tiboob and Wad Elbur. 
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5 Overview of the Gezira’s Agricultural 
Performance 
5.1 Cropping Intensity 
The cropping intensity in the Gezira Scheme is 
basically related to rotation policy. The percent-
age of land use within the adopted rotations dur-
ing the initial phases of the Scheme conformed to 
the designed cropping intensity (see Table 3). 
Hence, during that time rules of irrigation were 
strictly maintained and soil fertility and phyto-
sanitary considerations were given high attention. 
In addition, it was assumed that the tenants’ socio-
economic necessities had been accounted for 
through arrangements for production of a staple 
grain. This situation continued until 1960, when 
cropping intensity started to increase steadily, as a 
result of the intensification and diversification 
policy, but remained within the designed limits up 
to 1972 (Table 3).  
Afterwards, cropping intensity increased and ap-
proached its designed limit during 1973–1975 as a 
result of record areas of cotton and expanding 
acreages of wheat and groundnuts. Cropping in-
tensity continued to increase further during 1975–
1979 to reach an average of 80 %, thus expanding 
beyond the designed limit of land use intensity, 
75 % of total irrigated area. Despite a decline in 
cotton acreage during 1975–1979, wheat, sor-
ghum and groundnut cultivation expanded further, 
with a pronounced increase in wheat areas (see 
Figure 1).  
Cropping intensity decreased during the 1980s, 
averaging some 62 %, with land use intensities in 
some years as low as 55 %. It then increased in 
1990 to 78 % as a result of the government policy 
of expanding the production of food crops. Since 
then, however, declared government policies have 
resulted in a lack of financing of inputs, shortages 
in the maintenance of the irrigation network and a 
low management profile, thus depressing land use 
intensity, which reached its lowest level in 
1998/99. 
5.2 Development of Cultivated Areas 
The area under cultivation in the Gezira Scheme 
expanded rapidly during the first stages of the 
Scheme to reach over 80 % of the total scheme’s 
area in 1975/76 (see Figure 2). This expansion 
resulted from the intensification and diversifica-
tion policy adopted in the early 1960s, which en-
visaged the introduction of additional crops, that 
is, wheat and groundnuts, and expansion of the 
cultivation of cotton and sorghum. In subsequent 
years, the total cultivated area dropped until the 
early 1980s and fluctuated thereafter without a 
clear trend in the periods between 1983/85 and 
1986/87. The drop of total cultivated area from 
the late 1970s up to the early 1980s might be at-
tributed  to declining incentives to producers from 
Table 3: Actual Cropping Intensity in the Gezira Scheme, 1925–2001 
Years No. of cultivated cropsa Cropping intensity (in %)b 
1925-1931 
1931-1933 
1935-1960 
1961–1972 
1973 - 1975 
1975-1978 
1979-1980 
1981–onwards 
3 
1 
3 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
n.a 
n.a 
57.0 
62.0 
75.0 
80.0 
70.0 
62.0 
a Including only major crops like cotton, wheat sorghum, groundnuts and fodder 
b % of cropped in total irrigable area 
Source: Based on Appendix 2 
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export earnings, since the drop in cultivated areas 
was mostly attributed to declining acreages of 
export products, namely cotton and groundnuts 
(see Figure 1).  
Total cropped area increased steadily again from 
1987/88 in order then to undergo successive drops 
and in 1998/99 to reach the lowest cultivated area 
recorded throughout the Scheme’s history since 
1960. Many scholars attribute this development to 
government policies adopted during the 1990s, 
namely withdrawal of government finance for 
maintenance of irrigation infrastructure and provi-
sion of inputs (Eltigani et al. 2000).  
Variations in land allocation, or shares of different 
crop areas, are presented in Table 4. With regard 
to the development of acreages under individual 
crops, it appears that cotton acreage recorded a 
negative average growth rate from 1968–2001 
(see Figure 3). Based on the intensification policy 
pursued since the early 1960s, the area under cot-
ton increased steadily during the first phases of 
the Scheme to reach record areas of over 600 
thousand feddans in 1973/74 and 1974/75. Thus, 
all of the crop rotations adopted have been de-
signed to provide the best conditions for cotton 
cultivation, while most of the available finance, 
irrigation water and management capacities were 
allocated in the first line to cotton. However, since 
the 1975/76 season, cotton acreages started to 
decrease steadily until 1989 and then tumbled. 
The lowest recorded cotton acreages during that 
period were 358 thousand feddans in 1989/90 and 
383 thousand feddans in 1987/88 (see Table A 2). 
The strongest declines in cotton cultivation were 
recorded during the 1990s, when government 
financing gradually decreased and finally stopped 
altogether and budget funds for maintenance of 
the irrigation network became scarce. In the early 
1990s, the government emphasized the role of 
irrigated agriculture in contributing to food self-
sufficiency. Most available resources were allo-
cated to the production of wheat and sorghum. 
Accordingly, wheat acreage was expanded sub-
stantially to over 600 thousand feddans in 1990/91 
and was maintained at a level of over 500 thou-
sand feddans up to 1993/95. Similarly, sorghum 
area reached 507 thousand feddans in 1990/91 and 
was expanded further to 725 thousand feddans in 
1991/92 (see Table A 2). Due to limited resources, 
the expansion of food crop areas took place at the 
expense of cotton, the major export crop. There-
Figure 1: Average Crop Acreage, Gezira Scheme, 1949–2002 
 
Source: Based on Appendix 2 
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fore, agricultural exports recorded their lowest 
performance during the past two decades and in 
the first years of 1990s. 
As can be seen from Table 4, average growth rates 
of wheat areas, sorghum and groundnuts were 
positive during 1968–2002. Wheat areas grew 
successively up to the late 1970s as a result of the 
intensification and diversification policy. In the 
early 1980s, declining rainfall during the drought 
period, and hence limited water reserves, entailed 
a curtailment of wheat acreage, until wheat culti-
vation was completely given up in the 1985/86 
season. As already mentioned, wheat cultivation 
was expanded in the early 1990s to increase food 
production. Substantial government support in the 
form of finance for inputs and land preparation 
and better crop management was then provided 
for wheat cultivation and also for sorghum pro-
duction. However, the government policy changed 
in the late 1990s, leading to declining wheat culti-
vation as a direct result of the liberalization poli-
cies adopted, namely withdrawal of government 
finance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Development of Cultivated Areas in the Gezira Scheme, 1949/50–2001/02 
 
Source: Based on Table A 2 
Table 4: Growth Rates of Crop Areas, Gezira  
 Scheme, 1968–2002 
Year Growth rate (in %) 
 Cotton Wheat Sorghum G/nuts 
1968/70 9.2 22.5 15.2 1.9 
1971/73 3.7 52.9 -1.3 35.5 
1974/76 -9.3 197.9 -9.9 125.7 
1977/79 -5.5 17.0 32.1 -26.9 
1980/82 -2.6 -32.0 -7.5 -9.5 
1983/85 -2.0 -57.8 18.5 -25.9 
1986/88 -17.0 60.7 26.8 -16.9 
1989/91 -15.5 88.9 -6.0 -55.2 
1992/95 -56.7 23.1 37.8 67.5 
1995/97 63.9 -25.2 -33.0 72.1 
1998/00 -25.5 -58.8 -29.3 -21.2 
2001/02 -31.8 -52.8 98.7 -1.1 
Average -5.7 18.9 11.6 12.2 
Source: Based on Table A 2 
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5.3 Intensity of Input Use 
Endeavours aimed at improved crop performance 
in the Gezira Scheme have continued since the 
establishment of the Scheme. Accordingly, the 
Gezira Research Station managed, in close col-
laboration with the agricultural administration of 
the Gezira Scheme, to develop and adapt well-
defined technology packages, which are suitable 
for the Gezira environment, for all the products 
cultivated in the Scheme. These packages include 
a wide range of detailed information on individual 
crop input requirements, including quality and 
quantity of inputs as well as timing and methods 
of application (see Table 5).  
However, most of the literature on the Gezira 
Scheme refers to inadequate use of inputs as a 
result of various bottlenecks, including inadequate 
irrigation arrangements and management, short-
ages of finance and problems related to adopted 
policies. For example, it has been reported fre-
quently in almost all studies and reports about the 
Gezira Scheme that deteriorated irrigation infra-
structure and practices represent one of the most 
serious problems facing the Scheme. The prob-
Figure 3: Development of Crop Areas, Gezira Scheme, 1959–2002 
 
Source: Based on Table A 2 
Table 5: Current Input Use in the Gezira Scheme 
Crop Seed  
(kg/ha) 
Fertilizers (kg/ha) 
Urea  Super phos. 
Labour 
(mandays/ha) 
Average No. 
of irrigations 
ELS Cotton 
MS Cotton 
Wheat 
Sorghum (improved) 
Sorghum (traditional) 
Groundnuts 
17 
17 
60 
  3 
  6 
21 
80 
80 
80 
50 
  0 
  0 
  0 
  0 
50 
  0 
  0 
  0 
68 
60 
11 
27 
25 
52 
13 
11 
  6 
  6 
  6 
  8 
Source: Galal, M.Y. (1997) 
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lems pertaining to the whole set of aspects of irri-
gation have been covered in detail in many studies 
(Barnett 1977; Brandt et al. 1987; World Bank, 
2000; Gezira Scheme, 2001). Because of the run-
down of irrigation infrastructure, inadequate sup-
ply of irrigation water became the rule rather than 
the exception, especially during the 1990s, when 
the deterioration of the irrigation network acceler-
ated rapidly (Ahmed 2000). Table 6 presents re-
ported actual numbers of irrigations in selected 
years. 
There is no discernable trend in the frequency of 
irrigations. The information in Table 6 confirms 
that the actual irrigations used by tenants have 
always been lower than the recommended num-
bers of irrigations (see Table 7). Lower numbers 
of irrigation imply longer intervals between irriga-
tions, which under the climatic conditions of the 
Gezira Scheme would obviously restrict crop 
yields. 
The irrigation problem in the Gezira Scheme is 
not limited to reduced numbers of irrigations. 
There are significant variations in the efficiency 
of irrigation that are brought about by the location 
of tenancies. Long-term observations in the 
Gezira detected substantial yield differences be-
tween head and tail locations of tenancies. A 2001 
report on the Gezira Scheme estimates yield 
losses in the range of 30–50 % for different crops 
due to location at the tail of the canal (Table 8). 
These yield losses result from the use of lower 
than the recommended numbers of irrigations.  
The problem of declining intensity of input use is 
not limited to irrigation water. Financial, man-
agement and policy constraints have hindered the 
application of recommended inputs in quantity, 
quality or time horizon. Unfortunately, there are 
no data on actually applied type and quantity of 
inputs. However, a look at the growth of real costs 
of inputs used per feddan for cultivation of cotton 
(Barakat) in comparison to the growth of real 
prices of fertilizer and growth of the free market 
exchange rate of the Sudanese pound may shed 
some light on the development of input use inten-
sity and its anticipated effects on crop yield per-
formance. 
Table 6: Actual Number of Irrigations, Selected  
 Years 
Year Cotton Wheat Sorghum Groundnuts 
1980/81 
1983/85 
1986/87 
1989/90 
1992/93 
1995/96 
1998/99 
2000/01 
9–11 
8–11 
8–12 
9–13 
9–13 
n.a 
10–
12 
9–12 
5–6
6–7
5–7
6–8
6–7
6–7
5 
6–8
5–5 
5–5 
5–6 
5–6 
5–6 
5–6 
5 
5–6 
5–5 
5–5 
5–6 
6–7 
6–7 
7–8 
5 
5–6 
Source: The Gezira Scheme, Socio-economic Impact 
Study of the Pilot Program at Abdelhakam 
Block-Raising Productivity Through Broaden-
ing Farmer’s Choice on Farm systems and wa-
ter management, Barakat, unpublished re-
cords, 1980–2001 
Table 7: Recommended Number of Irrigations 
Crop Number of irrigations 
Cotton 
Wheat 
Groundnuts 
Sorghum 
16 
  8 
  8 
  8 
Source: The Gezira Scheme (2002) 
Table 8: Head to Tail Effects in Yields 
Crop Gezira Managil 
 Head Tail Head Tail 
Cotton 
(Ka/fed) 
Wheat 
(t/fed) 
Groundnuts 
(t/fed) 
Sorghum 
(t/fed) 
5.15 
 
0.57 
 
0.50 
 
0.51 
2.99 
 
0.39 
 
0.31 
 
0.35 
5.58 
 
0.51 
 
0.55 
 
0.57 
2.20 
 
0.30 
 
0.27 
 
0.39 
Source: The Gezira Scheme (2002) 
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5.4 Availability and Cost of Finance 
The immediate implication of the liberalization 
policy of the early 1990s for the Gezira Board was 
the need to become independent of government 
finance. Based on these policies, the Gezira 
Scheme could no longer rely, as usually, on the 
Bank of Sudan for financing of its foreign ex-
change requirements and production activities. 
Under such conditions, the Gezira Board, which 
channels the finance for the Gezira Scheme, had 
to rely on loans from commercial banks. While 
the financial needs of the Gezira Scheme are 
enormous and could not be secured from an indi-
vidual bank, the government established a consor-
tium of commercial banks in 1993 to secure the 
financial needs of the Gezira Scheme. In addition, 
other specialized banks like the newly established 
Farmers’ Bank and the Agricultural Bank of Su-
dan as well as other corporations like the Sudan 
Cotton Company have also been involved in 
financing the Gezira Scheme.  
In the course of the late 1990s, the Gezira Board 
faced a difficult situation, since rising inflation 
placed more cost pressure on producers and raised 
interest rates for credit and domestic budget defi-
cits decreased financing opportunities for crop 
cultivation, investments and development of infra-
structure. The financial requirements of the Gezira 
Scheme grew faster than the funds made available 
by the consortium of commercial banks. The total 
finance demanded by the Gezira Board increased 
in 1998/99 to reach about three times the total 
sum of agricultural credit offered by all commer-
cial banks at that time. The development of the 
financial requirements of the Gezira Scheme and 
the corresponding available finance is presented in 
Table 9. 
Table 9: Required and Available Finance and Source of Finance for the Gezira Scheme, 
Selected Years 
Year Required 
(Ls mio.) 
Available 
(Ls mio.) 
Shortfall 
(Ls mio.) 
Sourceb 
1987/88a 
1988/89a 
1989/90a 
 
1990/91 
1991/92 
1992/93 
1993/95 
 
1997/98 
1998/99 
1999/00 
2000/01 
2001/02 
2002/03 
630 
1110 
1735 
 
2000.0 
3852.5 
6072.0 
n.a 
 
58320.0 
69670.0 
127620.0 
178380.0 
n.a 
n.a 
315
561
837
1755.20
 3050.1
 5236.0
 3500.0
19572.0
68073.0
69770.0
33590.0
97880.0
82860.0
315
639
898
255.8
812.3
836.0
-
38858.0
1597.0
58850.0
155530.0
-
-
BS 
BS 
BS 
 
CBs 
CBs 
CBs 
CBs 
 
CBs, ABS, NIC, SCC 
BS,CBs, ABS, NIC, SCC 
BS,CBs, ABS, NIC, SCC 
BS,CBs, ABS, NIC, SCC 
BS,CBs, ABS, NIC, SCC 
BS,CBs, ABS, NIC, SCC 
a = in Ls/feddan 
b BS = Bank of Sudan; CBs = Consortium of commercial banks;  
ABS = Agricultural Bank of Sudan; NIC = National Insurance corporation; SCC 
   Sudan Cotton Company 
Source: Gezira Scheme, unpublished records, 1987–2003, Barakat 
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The information in Table 9 reflects the growing 
financial deficit experienced by the Gezira 
Scheme since the late 1980s. Simultaneously, the 
pressure on production costs continued and the 
provision of imported inputs became more diffi-
cult as a result of an increasing deficit in the bal-
ance of payments, thus leading to dropping yield 
performance, declining crop and tenant profits, 
and finally growing inability to repay loans. This 
situation forced the consortium of commercial 
banks to reduce their finance to the Scheme and, 
finally, to cease financing the Gezira Scheme. 
Debt accumulation for cotton and wheat is shown 
in Table 10. 
The debt crises led to the idling of large crop areas 
and deferred salary payments for the staffs of the 
Gezira Board. Confronted with this situation, the 
Government of Sudan again started providing 
loans to the Gezira Board as a result of the mount-
ing pressure from the tenants’ and workers’ un-
ions and as an attempt to stop the deterioration of 
the Scheme. In addition, the Gezira Board contin-
ued borrowing. 
5.5 Development of Crop Yields 
The development of crop yields in the Gezira 
Scheme is presented in Table 11, based on tri-
annual averages of growth rates from 1970–2001. 
The figures in the table document the absurd de-
velopment of growth yields of irrigated crops in 
the most important agricultural scheme. Thus, 
whereas yields of wheat, sorghum and groundnuts 
recorded rather weak average growth rates during 
the above-mentioned period, yields of cotton, the 
most important crop in the irrigated agriculture 
sector, recorded negative average growth rates. 
Cotton yields during the past three decades have 
consistently been declining, except for 1983–
1985. This exception was most probably due to 
the change from the joint account system to the 
individual account system, which was effectively 
introduced beginning in 1981/82. The long-term 
poor performance of cotton can be attributed to 
the unfavourable incentives that emerged for cot-
ton producers since the introduction of the irriga-
tion system in early 1920s. Based on the original 
partnership arrangement prior to the introduction 
of the individual account system in 1981/82, ten-
ants received about 50 % of their net income from 
the sale of cotton. This arrangement, together with 
the impact of cost allocation under the joint ac-
count system, which subsidizes low yield produc-
ers and penalizes high yield producers, resulted in 
disincentives to tenants. With the introduction of 
additional crops (wheat and groundnuts) into the 
cultivation system, the bias against cotton hus-
bandry increased; since all costs borne by the 
government or the Gezira Board were recovered 
Table 10: Cumulative Debts and Collection Ratio, Gezira Scheme, 1992/93–2000/01 
 Cotton Wheat 
Year Cumulative 
arrears plus 
seasonal costs 
Collection Ratio of 
collections to 
arrears 
Cumulative 
arrears plus 
seasonal costs 
Collection Ratio of 
collections to 
arrears 
1992/93 
1993/95 
1995/95 
1995/96 
1996/97 
1997/98 
1998/99 
1999/00 
2000/01 
752.9 
985.6 
1239.3 
2027.0 
7972.5 
92755.8 
75615.1 
105382.8 
395530.0 
0
129.7
563.5
337.7
0
75999.0
51522.5
65829.7
-
-
13.2
55.5
16.7
-
88.9
68.0
62.0
-
1912.1
3821.5
7303.8
10803.9
25000.0
-
85600.0
0
0
0 
0.328 
308.5 
1559.5 
1115.3 
- 
51900.0 
0 
0 
0 
0.01 
5.2 
13.5 
5.6 
- 
59.6 
- 
- 
Source: Suleiman, S.A. (2002) 
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from the proceeds of cotton sales. The reason why 
the Gezira Board adopts this procedure of cost 
recovery of irrigation cost, inputs and service 
costs is that it does not control the distribution of 
the proceeds from non-cotton crops. Moreover, 
non-cotton crops are favoured by allocation of 
appropriate levels of inputs under the control of 
the tenant; i.e. mainly labour input and by the 
possibility of shifting some of the inputs provided 
by the Gezira Board from cotton to tenant own 
non-cotton crops (wheat, sorghum and ground-
nuts). All these factors contributed to the bias 
against cotton husbandry. All in all, the poor yield 
performance of cotton and almost all other crops 
since 1996 through 2001 is a direct effect of less 
favourable marketing and pricing arrangements, 
combined with inappropriate financial policies 
and deteriorating infrastructure that have charac-
terized the period from the late 1960s up to the 
present time. 
Yield growth rates of wheat were also negative 
during the periods 1976–1978 and 1979–1981. 
Low wheat procurement prices (20–30 % lower 
than market prices) set by the government and 
forced delivery of harvests to authorized mills, 
presented disincentives for better husbandry man-
agement to increase productivity (Babiker 1986). 
Yield growth rates of sorghum were negative dur-
ing most of the 1980s, mainly because of the 
widespread low level of technology adoption in 
sorghum cultivation at that time. The crop was not 
important from the view point of the Gezira Board 
and therefore there were no arrangements for pro-
vision of inputs and services for the crop other 
than those made by tenants. Furthermore, most of 
the cultivated seed used during that time was of 
low quality and tenants often applied no or wholly 
insufficient amounts of fertilizers, whereas there 
were no arrangements for plant protection meas-
ures.  
The moderate growth rates of wheat as well as the 
substantial yield growth rates of sorghum during 
the early 1990s are a result of the heavy support of 
the then new government aimed at expanding 
food production. In the early 1990s, the Sudanese 
agricultural sector was characterized by a policy 
aimed at increasing self-sufficiency in food pro-
duction. Areas under food crops were expanded 
and more production inputs and services were 
provided to tenants at favourable conditions. 
However, severe financial problems, the increas-
ing deterioration of irrigation infrastructure, com-
bined with an inadequate supply of inputs, insuffi-
cient mechanization for land preparation, not to 
Table 11: Growth Rates of Crop Yields, Gezira Scheme, 
1973/75–2001/02 (in % p.a.) 
Year Barakat Acala Wheat Sorghum G/nuts 
1973/75 -13.9 -15.6 0.6 -5.10 52.1 
1976/78 -8.9 -8.9 -17.7 0.53 -19.6 
1979/81 -22.1 -22.1 -18.5 -20.21 -58.2 
1983/85 95.7 59.0 10.5 -6.67 55.5 
1986/88 -2.1 -15.2 12.0 -6.53 10.1 
1989/91 -3.9 -10.7 26.7 16.79 6.9 
1992/95 -15.6 12.2 19.9 55.75 25.6 
1996/98 -13.2 -15.5 -5.0 20.63 5.3 
1999/01 0.5 -3.6 -20.1 -7.06 -7.5 
2001/02 -19.6 -10.9 0.7 -22.80 -38.2 
Average -0.3 -1.9 0.9 1.6 1.9 
Source: See Table A 4 
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forget unfavourable weather conditions, depressed 
wheat yields again during the late 1990s.  
As can be seen from Table 11, groundnuts per-
formed poorly during the late 1970s, positive 
growth rates prevailed during the 1980s and 1990s 
and a downward turn followed during 1999–2001. 
The poor yields of groundnuts during the late 
1970s are mainly attributable to the tenants’ lack 
of finance for employment of the labour required 
by the labour intensive husbandry practices of the 
crop. This is an implication of the policy pursued 
by the Gezira Board when the crop was intro-
duced to the cropping system in the framework of 
the diversification policy in the early 1960s. And 
its cultivation was substantially expanded during 
the mid-1970s without any arrangements for fi-
nancing, provision of inputs and services and 
marketing of the crop. Tenant attempts to cope 
with this situation resulted in increased engage-
ment in crop sharing arrangements. Babiker 
(1986) reports that poor management and a lack of 
marketing facilities, in addition to problems in-
volving the monopolized export trade in the crop, 
were some of the main reasons for the poor per-
formance of groundnuts. The growth rates of 
groundnut yields during 1980–1998 can be asso-
ciated with decreased crop acreage during that 
period, which was followed by adjustments that 
led to a concentration of the cultivation of the 
crop in the hands of capable tenants in promising 
areas.  
5.6 Development of Costs of Production 
Nominal annual costs of crops produced in the 
Gezira Scheme during the past three decades are 
presented in Table A 5. These include costs of 
land preparation, costs of cultural operations as 
well as costs of material inputs, irrigation, har-
vesting, transportation and services. Total costs of 
production are highest for cotton; due mainly to 
higher pesticide and herbicide inputs as well as to 
higher labour costs. This implies that cotton is by 
far the most expensive crop to grow.  
Costs of crop production in the Gezira Scheme 
increased substantially during the 1990s. Table 12 
presents average growth rates of these costs for 
the period 1971–2002. It appears that costs of 
production of all crops increased between 1971–
2002 at a nominal annual rate of 50–55 %. This 
substantial increase is attributable to the high in-
flation experienced during the past decades. The 
negligible rate of inflation in Sudan in the early 
1970s increased steadily due to increasing de-
pendence on central bank financing (money print-
ing). Due to the launching of the bread-basket 
plan, the budget deficit during the early 1970s was 
huge, so that central bank finance was needed to 
supplement financing development expenditure 
from external sources. However, in the early 
1980s, finance flows from external sources were 
interrupted for political reasons and the govern-
ment was forced to resort heavily to central bank 
finance. As a result, the average annual rate of 
inflation reached 20 % during the 1970s. Stagna-
tion of the domestic economy coupled with prob-
lems bound up with balance of payments and in-
creased reliance on deficit financing during the 
1980s and early 1990s led to steady increases in 
the rate of inflation, which reached its highest 
level in June of 1996 (Abdelwahab 2001).  
Average growth in costs of crop production for all 
crops appears more or less to match the rate of 
inflation. During the early 1970s, the increase in 
crop production costs is more pronounced in the 
case of wheat. This might be due to the expensive 
land preparation needed for wheat and the rela-
tively high volume of fertilizer input. Compared 
to cost levels during the 1970s, production costs 
for cotton appear to have more than doubled in the 
1980s, presumably due to the introduction of the 
individual account system. The same trend ap-
plied for sorghum during that period. However, 
the most pronounced increase in crop production 
costs during the past three decades was recorded 
during the early 1990s, most probably due to the 
liberalization policy, which affected input markets 
much more than output markets. 
The impact of the substantial expansion of costs 
of crop production was vital for the Gezira 
Scheme. The immediate impact was a pronounced 
increase in financial requirements, a fact that led 
the  government  to seek  alternative  arrangements 
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for financing the Gezira Scheme by establishing 
the consortium of commercial banks. However, 
improved performance of crop production in the 
Gezira Scheme remained a remote option. As a 
result, tenant and Scheme debts owed to banks 
grew further, leading the commercial banks to 
discontinue financing the Scheme, and finally 
pushing the government to step in again to finance 
the Gezira Scheme.  
5.7 Net Profits by Crop and Tenant 
The development of real net profits per crop from 
1970–2001 are presented in Figure 4. Real net 
crop profits are obtained by deflating nominal 
crop profits (see Table A 6 a) using the consumer 
price index. As Figure 4 shows, real crop profits 
underwent heavy fluctuations during the period 
analysed. This is mainly due to fluctuations in 
crop yields during the period under consideration. 
However, it appears that real crop profits, espe-
cially for cotton and groundnuts, generally de-
creased during the 1990s as compared to their 
levels during the 1970s. Otherwise, it appears that  
 
there is no clear trend for the development of real 
net profits for sorghum and wheat. Most probably 
real net crop profits for the latter did not increase 
because of persistently low crop yields. 
The highest real net profit for cotton was recorded 
in the 1975/76 season. However, cotton realized 
neither a profit nor a loss in 1985, while it re-
corded negative profits in the 1990/91 and 
1999/00 seasons. The negative profits can be at-
tributed to a variety of reasons like increasing 
costs of production and low crop prices, but basi-
cally it is due to low crop yields. For example, in 
1985/86, real costs of material inputs for cotton 
increased by about 55 % as compared to the pre-
vious year, whereas cotton yield growth was nega-
tive, about 3.5 kantars/feddan. A similar trend, i.e. 
increasing costs and decreasing yields was regis-
tered for cotton in 1990/91, while the negative 
profit of cotton in 1999/00 was attributable solely 
to a substantial drop in per feddan yields to the 
lowest figure recorded during the period from 
1970–2001. Low crop yields were responsible for 
negative crop profits for wheat in 1978/79 (0.25 
ton/feddan), 1980/81 (0.257 ton/feddan), 1981/82 
Table 12: Growth of Nominal Costs of Production, Gezira Scheme, 1971–2002,  
(in % p.a.) 
Year Cotton Wheat Sorghum G/nuts Inflation (%) 
1971/73 5.6 12.2 -5.8 0.5 11.3 
1975/76 21.1 30.6 12.3 16.6 19.7 
1977/79 15.7 59.6 16.8 21.2 19.0 
1980/82 52.3 51.6 56.0 35.5 30.7 
1983/85 51.5 n.a 55.9 33.0 35.7 
1986/88 28.0 30.5 35.7 35.0 35.0 
1989/91 66.6 109.8 95.3 122.3 57.3 
1992/95 121.5 91.0 130.2 97.6 115.0 
1996/98 95.1 99.2 81.7 82.3 95.3 
1999/01 5.8 8.2 19.6 5.3 71.3 
2001/02 8.7 6.7 12.1 5.1 9.3 
Average 50.8 55.5 55.5 51.1 55.7 
Source: See Table A 5 
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(0.33 ton/feddan) and in 1998/99 (0.31 
ton/feddan). 
On this basis, it appears that cotton was by far the 
most profitable crop during the above-mentioned 
period of time, even though it is the most expen-
sive crop to grow. Also, the estimated 10-year 
average per feddan in real crop profits for the 
crops of the Gezira Scheme show that cotton was 
the most profitable crop (see Table 13). Among 
typical yields, groundnuts appear to be the next 
most profitable crop after cotton, followed by 
sorghum, whereas wheat has always been the least 
profitable crop. The increase in real crop profits 
Figure 4: Development of Real Net Crop Profit, Gezira Scheme, 1970–2001 
 
Source: Based on Table A 6a 
Table 13: Ten-Year Average Reala Net Per Feddan Crop 
Profit, Gezira Scheme, 
1970/71–2001/02 
Period Cotton 
Ls/feddan 
Wheat 
Ls/feddan 
Sorghum 
Ls/feddan 
G/nuts 
Ls/feddan 
1970/71–
1979/80 
364.15 78.19 122.57 242.39 
1980/81–
1989/90 
151.81 47.00 91.56 129.65 
1990/91–
1999/00 
148.23 61.74 183.82 192.93 
1970/71–
1999/00 
225.55 68.30 138.71 185.65 
2000/01–
2001/02 
350.13 248.15 320.74 105.58 
a Deflated with consumer price index (CPI) base year 1990=100 
Source: Based on Table A 6a 
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per feddan of cotton in the past two years was 
brought about by the expanded cotton yield (5.3 
kantars/feddan) in the 2001/02 season. 
In the light of reduced crop areas (see Table A 2) 
and real crop profits per feddan (see Table A 6b), 
it can clearly be seen that tenant real annual in-
come from crop production has rather deteriorated 
since the 1970s. The immediate repercussion of 
deteriorating annual tenant incomes is a growing 
tenant perception that a typical Gezira farm is 
unable to provide an income above the poverty 
line for an average tenant family. As a conse-
quence, tenants tended to resort more and more to 
crop sharing arrangements as a means of seeking 
alternative sources of income. The available lit-
erature suggests that tenants of the Gezira Scheme 
earn about 60–70 % of their annual incomes from 
off-farm employments nowadays (World Bank 
2000). Also, it is reported that about 50 % of the 
Gezira Scheme’s tenants earn additional income 
from livestock production. It should, however, not 
be overlooked that the major cause for this effect 
has not been real crop profit developments but 
reduced crop acreages, which in 1998/2000 stood 
at just about 50 % of 1974/79 levels. Reduced 
acreages in turn are due to grossly run-down in-
frastructure and service capacities. 
Increases in tenant annual incomes would only be 
possible with increased crop acreage and crop 
yield levels. Although poor crop performance has 
been a chronic problem in the Gezira Scheme, 
there is a potential for significant increases in crop 
yields. There are substantial yield gaps between 
the research yield levels and the long-term aver-
age crop yield levels of the Gezira Scheme (see 
Table 14).  
The result of the pilot scheme implemented with 
support of the FAO at the Abdel Hakam Block 
during 2000/01–2002/03 points to the possibility 
of attaining higher yield levels in the Gezira 
Scheme with improved husbandry practices and 
better management practices, especially as regards 
water resources (Table 16). Moreover, the infor-
Table 14: Research and the Gezira Scheme’s Attained Yields 
 Cotton 
Kantar/fedd. 
Other crops 
ton/fedd. 
 Barakat Acala Wheat Sorghum G/nuts 
Research yield levels a 
Highest yields attained b 
Abdelhakam Block yield levelc 
Average yield of Gezira Schemed 
12.3 
9.3 
n.ae 
4.5 
13.0 
9.8 
6.1 
4.0 
1.8 
1.1 
0.94 
0.5 
2.0 
1.5 
1.23 
0.6 
1.5 
0.93 
0.84 
0.7 
Yield gap between a and b 3.0 4.0 0.7 0.5 0.57 
Yield gap between a and d 7.8 9.0 1.3 1.4 0.8 
Yield gap between b and d 4.8 5.8 0.6 0.9 0.23 
Yield gap between c and d n.a 2.1 0.44 0.63 0.14 
a Frequently attained yield under research conditions 
b Frequently attained highest yield in the Gezira Scheme 
c Abdelhakam Block yield levelf 
d Average yield of Gezira Scheme during 1970 - 2001 
e There was no cultivation of barakat cotton at Abdelhakam Block in 2000/01 
f In season 2000/2001, the Gezira Scheme implemented a pilot project with the support of the FAO to in-
crease crop productivity. 
Source: a) Gezira Scheme, Planning and Economic Administration (2001) 
b) World Bank (2000) 
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mation in Table 14 shows that there is ample po-
tential for high yield levels in the Gezira Scheme 
if underlying problems are solved. 
5.8 Repercussions of Agricultural 
Performance 
5.8.1 Development of Production Output 
Average growth rates of annual crop output in the 
Gezira Scheme during the periods from 1970–
2001 are presented in Table 16. Most notable is, 
however, the absurd growth of cotton output in 
most of the years from 1971–2001. Except for 
moderate improvements during the periods 
1980/82 and 1986/88, growth rates of cotton out-
put either declined or showed weak improvement 
throughout the period analysed. The improved 
output growth rate for cotton in the period 
1980/82 can be attributed to the introduction of 
the individual account system in 1981/82. Cotton 
output recorded negative growth rates during 
1989/91 and 1998/00. The decline in cotton output 
for 1989/91 was the result of the implementation 
of the food self-sufficiency policy, which ex-
panded food crop areas at the expense of cotton 
cultivation. During 1998/00, cotton acreage was 
substantially reduced because of severe financial 
difficulties, deteriorated irrigation infrastructure 
and declining yields.  
Average growth rates for output for wheat, sor-
ghum and groundnuts recorded improved levels in 
the early 1970s, within the framework of the in-
tensification policy. Also, wheat and sorghum 
recorded positive output growth rates during the 
early 1990s as a result of the food-production-led 
government policy. However, while sorghum 
output continued to grow positively throughout 
the 1990s, wheat output recorded negative growth 
rates between 1995–2000. The reasons underlying 
this development are the difficulties in financing 
the cultivation of capital-intensive wheat produc-
tion, the deteriorated irrigation infrastructure, and 
hence declining yields of wheat. In contrast to 
wheat, sorghum production is not fully dependent 
on irrigation and imported inputs, a fact that fa-
cilitated the expansion of its cultivation during the 
end of the 1990s.  
Table 15: Average Annual Growth Rates of Production Output, Gezira 
Scheme, 1971/73–2001/2002 (in % p.a.) 
Year Cotton Wheat Sorghum G/nuts 
1971/73 0.5 57.8 30.3 99.9 
1975/76 -0.3 15.7 39.5 10.6 
1977/79 -6.1 -10.2 19.5 -17.2 
1980/82 20.6 -15.5 -2.5 15.9 
1983/85 -11.3 -30.6 38.2 7.2 
1986/88 16.5 20.2 -5.2 11.8 
1989/91 -12.0 52.9 33.9 -23.0 
1992/95 3.1 20.2 5.9 115.6 
1995/97 5.1 -2.5 7.8 11.2 
1998/00 -0.3 -5.0 36.3 -6.2 
2001/02 7.3 15.1 37.6 -70.0 
Average 2.0 7.1 20.9 15.1 
Source: Based on Table A 8 
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5.8.2 Development of Farm Gate Prices 
As regards the development of nominal farm gate 
prices of outputs, Table 16 shows that cotton 
prices increased during the period of the intensifi-
cation policy, i.e. during the 1970s. However, 
farm gate prices for cotton recorded negative 
growth rates during the early 1980s and late 
1990s. In the early 1990s, growth rates for farm 
gate prices of sorghum and groundnuts were high, 
whereas they were moderate for wheat due, pre-
sumably, to the then implemented government 
food self-sufficiency policy. However, the prices 
of these products recorded negative growth rates 
during 1992/95 because product prices decreased 
generally in 1993/95 as a result of expanded crop 
supplies due to the good rains at that period. The 
decrease in farm gate prices continued for wheat, 
sorghum and groundnuts from the late 1990s 
throughout 2001/02. 
5.8.3 Development of Agricultural 
Exports 
As can be seen from Figure 5, the volume of cot-
ton exports shows a negative trend during 1971–
2001. The highest cotton export volume was re-
corded in the early 1970s, while the lowest export 
volume was registered in the late 1990s. Endeav-
ours to expand cotton trade started in the post-
independence era. Accordingly, the focal point of 
Sudanese agricultural policy after independence 
was growth of the cotton trade. As a result, the 
Managil Extension of the Gezira Scheme was 
completed in the early 1960s to double the area 
sown with cotton. Additional schemes for cotton 
production (Rahad, New Halfa and Suki, in addi-
tion to the pump scheme alongside the Blue and 
White Nile), were established on the pattern of the 
Gezira Scheme during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Thereby, total cotton acreage grew from a little 
over 0.2 million feddans during the 1950s to reach 
over one million feddans during the 1970s. The 
substantial expansion in cotton area, coupled with 
improved production management and availability 
of good irrigation infrastructure, engendered sub-
stantial growth of cotton production. Conse-
quently, Sudan’s cotton exports (consisting up to 
the early 1980s mainly of long staple cotton) grew 
substantially during early 1970s to reach 1.3 mil-
lion bales in 1972/73. This volume of cotton ex-
ports accounted for about 50 % of the interna-
tional trade in extra long staple cotton, ELS, at 
that time, and represented about 61 % of Sudan's 
total export revenue (Abdeen 2000).  
After a sharp drop in 1973/75, the volume of cot-
ton exports increased during the mid-1970s to 
about 80 % of its level in the early 1970s, in order 
to drop towards the late 1970s to reach 353 thou-
sand bales in 1980/81. An increase in cotton ex-
ports was then recorded in the early 1980s after 
the implementation of the individual account sys-
tem. In 1985/85 and 1985/86, bad weather condi- 
 
Table 16: Average Annual Growth Rate of Nominal 
Farm Gate Prices, Gezira Scheme, 1971/73–
2001/02, (in %) 
Year Cotton Wheat Sorghum G/nuts 
1971/73 13.8 5.6 38.7 50.1 
1975/76 65.3 20.3 21.1 3.2 
1977/79 16.9 15.1 51.8 15.2 
1980/82 -25.3 -8.1 -28.5 10.6 
1983/85 -3.3 6.5 -6.6 35.6 
1986/88 6.3 21.9 11.5 -27.3 
1889/91 3.1 15.3 118.7 110.7 
1992/95 12.5 -9.6 -8.9 -6.3 
1995/97 5.2 18.2 11.7 -5.8 
1998/00 -6.0 1.6 5.6 -3.5 
2001/02 18.1 -9.1 -0.5 -6.5 
Average 9.5 6.9 19.5 15.1 
Source: Based on Table A 9 
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tions (drought) lead to decreasing volumes of 
cotton exports. However, the volume of cotton 
exports showed a decreasing trend throughout the 
1990s. As already mentioned, expanding food 
crop acreage in the early 1990s necessitated a 
decrease in cotton cultivation. In subsequent 
years, severe deterioration of irrigation infrastruc-
ture, financial difficulties and inappropriate incen-
tive policies led to decreased cotton exports.  
The impact of the development of the volume of 
cotton exports is depicted in Table 17. Although 
the growth rates presented here relate to the value 
of total Sudanese cotton exports, it appears that 
these growth rates coincide closely with the de-
velopment of cotton production in the Gezira 
Scheme. Hence, as already mentioned, about 2/3 
of cotton exports originate from the Gezira 
Scheme. Moderate growth rates for cotton export 
values were registered during 1976/78 and 
1982/85. The drop in cotton production and ex-
ports in the late 1970s was followed by the change 
of the joint account system to the individual ac-
count system in 1981/82. This policy improved 
the incentives for cotton production and resulted 
in higher production and export of cotton in the 
following year. In the mid-1980s, drought affected  
 
cotton and other crop production, leading to a 
decreasing export value for cotton. Similarly, the 
expansion of food crops under the food self-
sufficiency policy of the government in the early 
1990s was effected at the expense of cotton, thus 
leading to decreased output and, finally, decreased 
Figure 5: Development of Cotton Export Volume, Sudan, 1974–2001 
 
Source: Based on Table A 10 
Table 17: Growth Rate of Export Value of 
Cotton, Sudan, 1972–2001 
Year % p.a. 
1973/75 -10.3 
1976/78 55.5 
1979/81 -15.6 
1982/85 55.9 
1985/87 -33.5 
1988/90 29.1 
1991/93 -19 
1995/96 28 
1997/99 -7.8 
2000/02 -16.7 
Source: Based on Appendix 11 
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cotton exports. However, the decrease in cotton 
exports from the late 1990s through 2002 is above 
all a result of deteriorating production infrastruc-
ture and lack of finance, which resulted from the 
liberalization policy adopted.  
Figure 6 shows the development of cotton export 
value and cotton's share in total and agricultural 
export value during the mid-1970s through 2001. 
All appear to have decreased steadily throughout 
the period analysed. One exception is a limited 
expansion of cotton's share in total and agricul-
tural export value during 1985/89, which in-
creased compared to the level recorded in the 
early 1980s. The share of cotton export value in 
total export revenue was almost equivalent to the 
share of cotton in agricultural export value during 
the periods 1975/76–1985/89. However, cotton's 
share in total export value was higher than cotton's 
share in agricultural exports in the early 1990s. 
Cotton's share in total export decreased slightly 
beyond the share of cotton in agricultural exports 
during the late 1990s. This decrease became nota-
ble in 2000/01. However, since the result shown is 
calculated on an average basis, it conceals the fact 
that the dramatic decrease in cotton's share in total 
export value had started already during the late 
1990s. Exports of cotton - traditionally the Su-
dan's major export product – fell from 50 % of 
total export earnings during the 1980s to reach 
22 % in 1995. The deterioration of cotton exports 
continued throughout the late 1990s, finally repre-
senting only 2.5 % of total export earnings in 
2000. 
As regards groundnuts, the export volume in-
creased in the mid 1970s to reach over 280 thou-
sand tons in 1976/77 (see Figure 7). This expan-
sion was a result of expanding groundnut produc-
tion due to the intensification policy. Afterwards, 
groundnut exports decreased from the late 1970s 
throughout 2001. This is, however, not a reflec-
tion of declining groundnut production but rather 
of the increased diversion of groundnut produc-
tion for local processing into edible oil for domes-
tic markets and also for export. The value of ex-
ports of groundnut oil reached US $ 10.3 million 
in 1976 and increased to US $ 19.7 million in 
1978 (Bank of Sudan 1980). Although the export 
value of groundnut oil fluctuated heavily during 
the 1980s and 1990s, it recorded levels as high as 
US $ 57.7 million in 1997 (Bank of Sudan). 
 
 
Figure 6: Index of Cotton Export Value, Cotton Share of Total and Agricultural Export  
 Value, Sudan, 1975/76–2001/02 
 
 
Series1: Cotton Exports 
Series 2: Share of Total Exports 
Series 3: Share of Agricultural Exports 
Source: Based on Table A 11 
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Although sorghum is not a traditional export 
product of the Sudan, the crop is exported from 
time to time, especially when there is a record 
harvest as a result of suitable weather conditions. 
Sorghum is cultivated in huge areas (between 15–
20 million feddans) under rain-fed conditions on 
large mechanized farms and on traditional small 
farms. However, sorghum yields under rain-fed 
agriculture are low as compared to yields under 
irrigated agriculture. Sorghum cultivation under 
irrigated agriculture underwent substantial expan-
sion during the past decade. As already men-
tioned, current sorghum cultivation in the Gezira 
Scheme amounts to an average of about 0.5 mil-
lion feddans. Taking into account the relatively 
higher sorghum yields under irrigated agriculture, 
the role of irrigated agriculture in domestic and 
export production of sorghum cannot be over-
looked.  
As can be seen from Figure 8, the volume of sor-
ghum exports increased from less than 50 thou-
sand tons in 1970/71 to over 500 thousand tons in 
the early 1980s. This volume dropped during the 
famous drought in Sudan between the years 1983–
1985 and increased afterwards, as a result of good  
 
 
weather conditions, to over 500 thousand tons in 
the 1986/87 season. 
6 Home-Made Causes of the Gezira’s 
Weak Performance 
The weak performance of the Gezira Scheme in 
the 1980s and 1990s is a result of constraints 
stemming from institutional weaknesses, deterio-
ration of infrastructure and inappropriate incentive 
policies. While rigid land policies discouraged 
investments, inflexible cropping patterns and cost-
fixing procedures led to a separation of resource 
prices from resource-use decisions. These con-
straints combined with monopolized marketing of 
input and output, in addition to the absence of 
institutional credit, worked to the effect of imped-
ing the expansion of crop productivity and finally 
hindered growth in tenant and Scheme incomes. 
All this developed, of course, against the back-
ground of a declining trend in real world market 
prices. 
 
Figure 7: Development of Groundnut Export Volume, Sudan, 1970–2001 
 
Source: Based on Table A 10 
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6.1 Institutional Weakness 
Since the establishment of the Gezira Scheme, 
marked transformations have taken place. These 
include changes in the technology used, changes 
in the degree of commercialisation of production 
and changes in the socio-economic environment 
of tenants (Eldaw 1999). Thus, at present more 
mechanization is involved in crop production, 
while the cultivation of crops has become largely 
based on improved seeds and application of fertil-
izers and chemicals. These changes have paved 
the way for the introduction of new crops and 
improved varieties that have provided a high po-
tential for vertical expansion of crop production. 
Similarly, market oriented production intensified 
through the introduction of cash crops, whereas 
links to international markets were strengthened 
through increased cultivation of export crops and 
greater imports of inputs and equipment. Finally, 
these transformations have led to a changing 
socio-economic environment, which has in turn 
affected the prices of inputs, costs of services and 
the profitability of crops. In spite of all that, the 
original institutional arrangements conditioning 
the whole process of crop production in the Gezira 
Scheme, like the land tenure system, the cropping 
system and production relations as well as the  
 
credit and marketing arrangements, have re-
mained, in essence, in their original form.  
6.1.1 Land Tenure 
The original land tenure system has had many 
impacts on tenants, especially on the land owners. 
The first step taken was the government's compul-
sory land tenancy policy and allotment of tenan-
cies to right-holders and non-right-holders alike, 
in order to cultivate the land under the prescribed 
tenancy agreement. This step has severely con-
strained the property rights of right-holders. 
Hence, except for a symbolic rent, they could 
neither terminate the compulsory lease nor culti-
vate their tenancies with crops other than those 
stipulated by the Gezira Board. On this basis, 
tenant incentives to invest and work more to 
maintain and improve the fertility of the land were 
limited due to the effective control of the land by 
the government (Gezira Board). Under the current 
land tenure system most such investments, for 
example land levelling, have became the respon-
sibility of the Gezira Board, which has neglected 
such activities since about 1970 due to financial 
and infrastructure constraints. 
Figure 8: Development of Sorghum Export Volume, Sudan, 1970–2001 
 
Source: Based on Table A 10 
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In addition, the compulsory rent level11 and its 
continuation without annual revision and adjust-
ments has resulted in low land value. Had it not 
been for the current land tenure arrangements, the 
landless tenants would have paid higher rents to 
the land owners and land rent payments would 
have been adjusted to the marginal productivity of 
land. This prevented land owners from accumulat-
ing capital for more investments. Moreover, while 
formal sale of tenancies is forbidden by law under 
the land tenure system adopted, investments in the 
form of aggregation of land to sizes necessary for 
higher incomes are not possible. 
6.1.2 The Cropping System 
As already mentioned, decisions on crop choice, 
crop mix and order of crop cultivation are the 
domain of the Gezira Board. However, these deci-
sions are reflected in a uniform crop rotation that 
is applicable to all regions and tenants of the 
scheme. In this way the crop rotation adopted 
bypasses any differences in environmental en-
dowments of the various regions of the scheme 
and neglects marked differences in the socio-
economic situation of tenants. Uniform crop rota-
tion therefore represents a source of inefficiency. 
It constrains tenant management choices concern-
ing cultivated crops with regard to environmental 
situation and the socio-economic conditions it 
implies.  
In addition, the Gezira Board imposes a manda-
tory requirement on tenants to abide by specified 
husbandry practices, at least for cotton. Accord-
ingly, the Gezira Board decides on the volume 
and quality of inputs applied as well as on type 
and timing of various agricultural activities, in-
cluding land preparation. These decisions apply, 
also, uniformly for all regions and all tenants, thus 
intensifying the constraint on tenant management 
                                                     
11 According to Abdel Salam (1987), the customary pay-
ment for land, from which the tenancy agreement should 
have departed, was 10% of the crop, whereas land own-
ers were offered only Ls 0.10 per feddan per annum. The 
land rent offered was fixed at this low level to avoid any 
reduction in the government's expected revenue.  
choices, substantially affecting tenant financial 
costs and, finally, incomes.  
6.1.3 Production Relations 
Based on the production relations in the Gezira 
Scheme, the Gezira Board charges the tenants for 
irrigation and administrative services, inputs sup-
plied as well as for any other services provided. 
The levels of the charges and costs paid by tenants 
are fixed discretionally by the Gezira Board, on an 
average basis, and are applied uniformly to all 
tenants. As already mentioned, the Gezira Board 
applies a flat rate for water costs for a fixed num-
ber of irrigations for each crop, irrespective of a 
tenancy's regional and canal location, a fact which 
leads to marked differences in the volume, timeli-
ness and number of irrigations received by any 
crop. And this in turn causes substantial yield 
variability and hence significant income differ-
ences. 
Similarly, all tenants pay the same amount for 
each of the inputs supplied or services provided. 
Nevertheless, the actual costs of inputs supplied 
vary from location to location (transportation 
costs), while variations in times of application 
lead to variations in yields. Also, different land 
types lead to variations in the costs of mechanical 
operations (land preparation), while the timeliness 
of their completion leads to yield variability. Ac-
cordingly, the uniform pattern of costing supplied 
inputs and services separates resource prices from 
resource-use decisions. As a result, it constrains 
tenant management choices and provides fewer 
incentives for tenants to improve the efficiency of 
their husbandry practices in order to increase their 
incomes.  
6.1.4 Institutional Credit 
The decision to confine formal loans for crop 
production in the Gezira Scheme to cotton and 
wheat leaves the tenants with the problem of se-
curing finance for the production and marketing 
of the other crops. This problem is further aggra-
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vated by the inadequacy of the Gezira Board’s 
cash advances for agricultural activities as well as 
by an increasing reliance on hired labour as a re-
sult of the increase in number of cultivated crops 
after the implementation of the diversification and 
intensification policy in 1960. Given the absence 
of formal finance in the Gezira, the options open 
for most tenants were: either underutilization of 
capacities through “un-intensive” production, or 
resort to the informal credit market, with its al-
leged high costs of finance (Magar 1987; Ahmed 
Humeida 1987; Hassan 1993; Galal 1997). While 
sustained profitable production in the Gezira 
Scheme has been hampered by a variety of institu-
tional, infrastructure and policy problems, the 
burden of capacity underutilization and the high 
cost of informal loans have forced tenants into 
debt. As already mentioned, the immediate out-
come of this development has been an increasing 
tenant tendency to sublease land and engage in 
crop sharing arrangements, in addition to illegal 
sale of tenancies, though at rather low prices. 
Tenant financial problems were further aggra-
vated by the implementation of the liberalization 
policy in the early 1990s. The impact of these 
policies was more pronounced in input markets 
than in output markets. As a result, prices of in-
puts, especially imported inputs, and the costs of 
labour and services increased substantially. In 
addition, the deteriorating balance of payments 
and weak fiscal performance that characterized 
the economy between the late 1970s and the 
1990s, together with the fading out of external 
finance, led to rampant inflation that resulted in a 
substantial expansion of the amount of finance 
required during the 1990s (Abdelwahab 2001). 
Although this development encouraged the adop-
tion of an alternative credit policy for the whole 
agricultural sector, the original credit arrange-
ments for the Gezira Scheme remained un-
changed. While commercial bank loans replaced 
the government loans, the loans provided contin-
ued to be confined to cotton and wheat and the 
administration of loans remained under the man-
agement of the Gezira Board. Tenant problems in 
finding finance not only remained unsolved but 
were even aggravated due to the high costs of the 
finance provided by the commercial banks. This 
has led to further underutilization of available 
capacities that prevents tenants from attaining 
break-even yields, in addition to increasing out-
movements of young tenants and labourers and 
more sub-leasing of tenancies and crop sharing 
arrangements. 
6.1.5 Agricultural Marketing 
The dominance of the state marketing parastatals 
in important input and output markets has had 
negative impacts on the development of crop 
yields and crop output in the Gezira Scheme. The 
major objectives of the government have been 
maximization of crop production and the related 
domestic and foreign exchange earnings rather 
than maximization of tenant incomes or economic 
efficiency. As already mentioned, various meas-
ures were adopted to realize the state’s objectives. 
These included under-pricing of farm products 
and over-pricing of agricultural inputs, in addition 
to marketing boards and various export taxes and 
import duties as well as local taxes. Accordingly, 
farm gate prices of products have always been far 
below levels of free market prices. D’Silva and 
Elbadawi (1988) reported that during the 1970–
1984 period farm gate prices for cotton and 
groundnuts  were lower by about 46–52 %, and by 
about 30–41 % of their border price equivalent, 
respectively. Similarly, Babiker (1987) stated that 
wheat could be sold unofficially at prices 20–
30 % higher than the procurement prices offered 
by the Gezira Board. Although the producer prices 
of some products have increased as a result of 
state policies during the 1990s, the practice of 
selling in advance, which was frequently adopted 
by the Gezira Board during the 1990s to secure 
credit (mainly for cotton), has inflicted significant 
injustice upon tenants and contributed to eroding 
tenant incentives. 
As regards the local marketing of sorghum and 
groundnuts, most tenants are forced to market 
their produce through the shail system due to their 
persistent credit needs during the cultivation pe-
riod (Magar 1987). The literature, however, sug-
gests significant negative impacts of the shail 
credit system on the producer prices of these 
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products (Magar 1987; Ahmed Humeida 1987; 
Babiker 1987).  
Government control over input marketing in the 
Gezira Scheme is practiced through the Gezira 
Board, which closely cooperates in this respect 
with the Agricultural Bank of Sudan and the 
Farmers’ Bank, which supplies inputs. The prices 
of inputs supplied are fixed by the Gezira Board at 
higher levels than the prevailing input prices in 
the free market. In addition, the prices of inputs 
are always declared at the end of the season, and 
thus the Gezira Board is always able to add on any 
price increases incurred during the season. The 
result of this pattern of input pricing is not only 
substantially higher prices, compared to free mar-
ket prices, for inputs at the beginning of the sea-
son but also a separation of prices from resource-
use decisions. This behaviour suggests, also, that 
the involvement of the Gezira Board and other 
similar governmental parastatals in input market-
ing has been a source of disincentives to a more 
efficient producer contribution to the production 
process.  
6.1.6 Agricultural Technology 
6.1.6.1 Agricultural Research 
Although the Gezira Research Station (GRS) has 
been closely involved in researching the problems 
of the Gezira Scheme, its affiliation with the na-
tional Agricultural Research Corporation (ARC) 
has lessened its direct commitment and dedication 
to the research problems of the Gezira Scheme. 
Hence, under this pattern of organization, deci-
sions on research programs, provision of funds, 
equipment and materials for research as well as 
training of research staffs are strongly driven by 
national objectives rather than by the research 
needs of the Gezira Scheme. As a result, field 
crops, the diversification and intensification of 
which have been the major objective of govern-
ment, have dominated research interest.  
In spite of that, a conducive research atmosphere12 
in recent years has enabled the staff of the Gezira 
Research Station to develop suitable production 
technologies for the Gezira Scheme. However, the 
research focus has been more on technical aspects 
and, hence these technologies have been devel-
oped with no/or minimal consideration of their 
socio-economic impacts. Capacities for improve-
ment of socio-economic aspects of irrigated agri-
culture seem to be lacking within the ARC and the 
Gezira Scheme. In this respect, Zahlan (1986) 
notes that the annual reports of the Gezira Re-
search Station imply an intensive research cover-
age of almost all disciplines of agriculture with 
the exception of agricultural economics. The ma-
jor reasons behind this inadequate socio-economic 
research are the lack of capacities for socio-
economic research and shortage of funds for train-
ing and capacity building.   
In addition, involvement of the Gezira Research 
Station in researching the problems of the Gezira 
Scheme has substantially narrowed in conse-
quence of recent economic and political develop-
ments in Sudan. Technical and financial support 
from outside started to decline in the early 1980s 
and finally ceased during the 1990s. Moreover, 
government financial support for the provision of 
equipment, research material and for staff training 
has also significantly declined. Similarly, finan-
cial support from agricultural schemes declined 
and took on an ad hoc form during the 1990s. The 
consequences of such developments have been 
stagnation of research activities and discontinuity 
of technology development, in addition to brain 
drain and lack of capacity building, which are in 
turn reflected in declining crop performance and, 
finally, declining tenant incomes. 
6.1.6.2 Extension Services 
Before 1969, general agricultural inspectors car-
ried out the responsibilities of agricultural exten-
                                                     
12 Facilitated by the government as well as by international 
support and provision of research funds from the Gezira 
Scheme. 
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sion. Expert extension services were introduced in 
the Gezira Scheme after 1969, when 17 extension 
workers were assigned to carry out the responsi-
bilities of agricultural extension there (Hassan et 
al. 1986). The focus of the field inspectors has 
largely been on commodity development (mainly 
cotton) rather than community development. This 
seems to indicate, however, not only inadequate 
manpower but also inadequate extension service 
programs. In spite of that, the Department of Ex-
tension Services of the Gezira Scheme managed, 
with the support of partners like the FAO, to con-
tribute to testing research results in demonstration 
fields and dissemination of information through 
field days, radio and television and through group 
discussions and field visits.  
The ratio of extension officers to tenants has im-
proved considerably, reaching 1:400 in 1996. 
However, the department is working under con-
siderable difficulties due to limited funds for 
transportation, audiovisual equipment and printing 
materials. Similarly, the department lacks funds 
for training of extension officers and support staff 
and also for seminars and workshops for tenants. 
All of these obstacles have reduced the quality 
and coverage of extension services to unsatisfac-
tory levels.  
6.2 Infrastructure Deterioration 
Financial difficulties and shortage of foreign ex-
change during the past decades has hindered the 
required improvements in the infrastructures of 
the Gezira Scheme. Thus, increasing silt deposits, 
inadequate and delayed silt removal operations 
and insufficient maintenance of hydraulic struc-
tures has underlined the deterioration of the irriga-
tion network during the few past years. Similarly, 
shortage of spare parts, equipment and lack of 
replacement machinery has led to decreasing 
technical efficiency and increasing repair fre-
quency and costs. All these difficulties, however, 
have resulted in inadequate production services 
and hence weak yield performance and increased 
production costs and, finally, uneconomic produc-
tion from the tenant and national point of view.  
6.2.1 Irrigation Infrastructure 
The capacity of the irrigation network of the 
Gezira Scheme has experienced a significant drop 
during the past two decades. The major reasons 
behind this deterioration are the annual deposition 
of silt and lack of silt removal, in addition to over-
loading of the capacity of the irrigation network 
and lack and inadequate routine maintenance of 
the irrigation network. According to estimates of 
the Ministry of Irrigation (2002), the storage ca-
pacity of the reservoirs of the Sennar and Roseires 
dams had already decreased by about 34 % and 
25 %, respectively, in 1985. The negative impact 
of this declining reservoir capacity is borne 
mainly by wheat cultivation, which depends en-
tirely on irrigation, whereas the other crops like 
cotton, sorghum and groundnuts, which are culti-
vated during the rainy season, largely benefit from 
rainfall.  
The volume of the silt entering the canals of the 
Gezira Scheme increased substantially after the 
establishment of the Managil Extension in 1960 
and the implementation of the intensification and 
diversification policy in the early 1960s. The irri-
gation water released from the dam has increased 
substantially as a result of the successive expan-
sion of cultivated areas of crops. Accordingly, the 
amount of irrigation water released from the dam 
increased to about 7.1 billion cubic meters com-
pared with the roughly 2 billion cubic meters of 
released from the dam before the 1960s. The silt 
carried with the irrigation water settles in varying 
volumes in various types of canals. According to 
the Ministry of Irrigation (2002), the minor canals 
receive the highest amount of silt entering the 
canalisation system (33 %). The accumulation of 
silt over the years (due to inadequate silt removal 
operations) has not only depressed the capacity of 
the minor canals, it has also created conducive 
conditions for canal infestation by abundant weed 
growth, further aggravating the situation. Conse-
quently, the efficiency of delivery of irrigation 
water has dropped substantially. This has resulted, 
in turn, in reduced numbers of irrigations per crop, 
decreased volume of watering per irrigation and 
delayed irrigation in many areas of the scheme, 
and this has lead to declining yields. 
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6.2.2 Infrastructure for Production 
Services 
Like the deterioration in irrigation services, the 
efficiency of other infrastructure for production 
services has decreased as a result of financial dif-
ficulties and shortage of foreign exchange. This 
applies for the Department of Agricultural Engi-
neering, the Gezira Light Railway and the Cotton 
Ginneries as well as to the telecommunication 
infrastructure, workshops, buildings and vehicles 
of the Gezira Board. The deterioration of these 
infrastructures resulted in reduced quality and 
volume of the services produced by them as well 
as growing maintenance frequencies and repair 
costs.  
6.3 Price and Production Incentives 
Since independence, the Sudanese government 
has intervened in the agricultural sector in a vari-
ety of ways. The driving force for government 
intervention is the dominant role of agriculture in 
the economy. Hence, agricultural performance 
necessarily conditions the basic features of the 
overall economic process, domestically as well as 
in relation to the outside world. The various gov-
ernment policies adopted in the agricultural sector 
have provided varying producer incentives or 
disincentives, which in turn have distinctly af-
fected the performance of agriculture, especially 
in terms of crop yields. 
6.3.1 Output Price Incentives 
Table 18 highlights the trend of the impact of 
adopted policies on producer prices for the major 
crops of the Gezira Scheme based on their nomi-
nal protection coefficients (NPCs)13. The NPCs14 
                                                     
13 The nominal protection coefficient (NPC) is defined as 
the ratio of the price of a product received by the local 
producer to the c.i.f. price of the product minus market-
ing and processing costs. An NPC ratio of a product that 
is greater than one indicates subsidization of the crop in 
question, while a ratio of less than one indicates taxation.      
presented indicate that, with the exception of sor-
ghum, all crops were subjected to various magni-
tudes of taxation up to 1998. In the framework of 
its liberalization policy, the government empha-
sized the role of agricultural exports, import sub-
stitution and food self-sufficiency. Various meas-
ures were adopted to implement this policy. The 
government effected a gradual reduction of export 
taxes, abolished state marketing and export mo-
nopolies and lifted price controls to encourage the 
production of export and import substitution 
crops. The results of the NPCs presented closely 
coincide with the government policy adopted. The 
estimated NPCs for sorghum reveal the support of 
government policy for production of food crops. 
Also, this trend is reflected in the wheat NPCs up 
to 1997, before the complete liberalization of 
wheat production in 1998, while cotton producer 
incentives have improved only since 1999. As 
regards groundnuts, the NPCs presented reveal the 
continuation of price distortions caused by the 
activities of the Oil Seed Marketing Board, which 
still enjoys its monopoly status in exporting oil 
seed crops. 
6.3.2 Overall Production Incentives 
The information in Table 19 shows the impact of 
policies adopted on input and output prices. This 
effect of policies is measured on the basis of the 
Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC)15. The 
result in Table 19 confirms the impact of the 
adopted policy mentioned above. Thus, cotton and 
groundnut production was taxed in the early 
1990s and food crop production was heavily sup-
                                                                                  
14 The calculations of NPCs are based on the procedure 
adopted by Eldaw (1999). 
15 The Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) measures the 
combined impact of exchange rate and trade policies on 
prices of outputs and tradable inputs and thereby on pro-
ducer incentives. The EPC is the quotient of the differ-
ence of traded output and inputs at market prices to the 
respective difference valued at economic prices. An EPC 
greater than one indicates an incentive to producers 
through the protective measures adopted indirect and di-
rect subsidies. An EPC of less than one implies disincen-
tives and implicit and/or explicit taxation. 
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ported. While the production incentives for cotton 
have improved since the mid-1990s, and govern-
ment support continued for sorghum production, 
the liberalization of wheat production after 1998 
brought disincentives for producers. As regards 
groundnuts, the estimated EPCs reveal a negative 
impact of the policies adopted or of the indirect 
taxation they have involved. 
However, it is worth mentioning at this juncture 
that, in spite of an improving tendency in the pro-
duction environment as a result of policies 
adopted, the performance of crop production in 
the Gezira Scheme tended more to deteriorate 
than to improve, especially from 1998 through 
2001. This result is, however, to a large extent 
attributable to the prevailing weakness of institu-
tional arrangements and the advanced state of 
deterioration of all production infrastructures. A 
further decisive role has been played by falling 
real world market prices, which, after an intermit-
tent hausse during 1991–97, have slumped pre-
cipitously since 1998. 
 
Table 18: Nominal Rate of Protection for Major Crops in the Gezira Scheme,  
1990/91–2001/02 
Season Crops 
 Long 
Staple cotton 
Medium staple 
cotton 
Wheat Sorghum G/nuts 
1990/91 
1992/94 
1995/97 
1998/99 
1999/00 
2000/01 
2001/02 
0.36 
0.60 
0.80 
0.87 
1.06 
0.91 
1.59 
0.30 
0.65 
0.69 
0.76 
0.84 
1.04 
1.48 
0.65 
0.73 
0.76 
0.22 
0.41 
0.64 
0.49 
2.67 
0.90 
1.05 
0.98 
1.09 
1.80 
1.46 
0.43 
0.21 
0.27 
0.16 
0.22 
0.25 
0.21 
Source: Results of own calculations, for method of calculation see Table A 11 
Table 19: Effective Protection Coefficients for Major Crops in the Gezira Scheme, Selected 
Periods 
Season Crops 
 Long 
Staple cotton 
Medium staple 
cotton 
Wheat Sorghum G/nuts 
1990–1991 
1992–1994 
1995–1997 
1998/99 
1999/00 
2000/01 
2001/02 
0.51 
0.79 
1.27 
1.74 
2.40 
1.30 
2.23 
0.49 
0.97 
1.12 
1.37 
1.98 
1.61 
3.10 
6.80 
1.26 
1.38 
0.22 
0.53 
0.88 
0.68 
9.10 
1.39 
1.56 
1.52 
1.72 
3.16 
2.80 
0.44 
0.22 
0.43 
0.17 
0.23 
0.27 
0.25 
Source: Results of own calculations, based on method exemplified in Table A 11 
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Appendix 1: The Joint Account System 
The joint account system is an account procedure adopted by the Gezira Scheme to divide the balance of 
cotton production costs and total cotton proceeds between tenants, the Government of Sudan and the Gezira 
Board according to specified shares. Development of the joint account system up to its abolition in 1980/81 
is given in the table below. 
 
Table A 1: Development of Respective Shares Within the Joint Account System 
Year Tenants Government SGB Farmer’s 
Reserve 
Fund 
Social 
Services 
Munici-
palities 
1925–1949/50 
1950/51–1962/63 
1963/64–1964/65 
1965/66–1968/69 
1969/70–1970/71 
40 
42 
44 
48 
47 
40 
42 
40 
36 
36 
20 
10 
10 
10 
10 
- 
2 
2 
2 
2 
- 
2 
2 
3 
3 
- 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1981– Abolition of the joint account system 
Source: Galal, M. Y. (1997) 
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Appendix 2: Basic Tables of Production Performance, Gezira Scheme,  
  1949/50–2001/02  
Table A 2: Actual Cropped Area of Various Crops Gezira Scheme, 
1949/50–2001/2002 (in 1000 feddans) 
Year Cotton Wheat Sorghum G/nuts Othersa Total 
1949/50 207 - 104 1 65 377 
1954/55 235 - 118 1 55 409 
1959/60 386 - 192 10 118 707 
1964/65 507 75 255 60 95 994 
1965/66 510 75 254 120 84 1.042 
1966/67 543 90 274 144 91 1.142 
1967/68 553 138 314 101 102 1.208 
1968/69 573 130 292 79 173 1.247 
1969/70 577 25 288 150 173 1.328 
1970/71 588 144 294 149 302 1.358 
1971/72 589 131 294 117 156 1.287 
1972/73 589 145 295 178 130 1.337 
1973/74 604 254 301 216 76 1.452 
1974/75 603 428 154 361 49 1.605 
1975/76 396 568 341 424 26 1.767 
1976/77 499 505 351 251 31 1.650 
1977/78 519 466 354 264 24 1.636 
1978/79 498 493 344 217 27 1.584 
1979/80 541 363 327 229 33 1.502 
1980/81 501 367 301 171 43 1.388 
1981/82 435 267 344 264 36 1.347 
1982/83 484 155 321 148 29 1.138 
1983/84 498 265 411 136 36 1.347 
1984/85 465 - 420 213 26 1.123 
1985/86 401 243 579 103 30 1.354 
1986/87 415 180 488 151 36 1.270 
1987/88 383 252 395 160 41 1.231 
1988/89 404 274 427 111 46 1.262 
1989/90 358 392 441 80 56 1.327 
1990/91 251 613 507 40 91 1.472 
1991/92 216 533 725 36 62 1.606 
1992/93 175 514 622 164 52 1.530 
1993/94 150 523 547 187 49 1.457 
1994/95 253 393 468 191 100 1.404 
1995/96 301 391 394 230 57 1.373 
1996/97 331 390 407 246 40 1.414 
1997/98 246 302 339 223 36 1.147 
1998/99 154 123 285 146 24 731 
1999/00 260 59 274 155 23 856 
2000/01 208 71 509 171 70 1.011 
2001/02 190 81 679 45 130 1.230 
a Includes vegetable, lubia, phillipisara and fodders 
Source: Unpublished records of the Gezira Scheme, Barakat, 1950–2002 
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Table A 3: Nominal Costs of Material Inputs for Cotton (Barakat) Cultivation in the Gezira 
Scheme and Market Exchange Rate, 1985/86–1995/96 
Season Cost of material input 
Ls/feddan 
Price of fertilizer Ls/ton Market exchange rate 
US $/Ls 
1985/86 330 199.4 4.25 
1986/87 1020 436.22 5 
1987/88 611 396.9 8 
1988/89 648.2 426.86 10 
1989/90 1140 593.03 10 
1990/91 1340 565.8 12.5 
1991/92 3380.0 1015.2 30 
1992/93 8040.0 2614.0 143 
1993/94 26160.0 13058.2 335 
1994/95 50720.0 17610.0 525 
1995/96 105707.2 26913.0 905 
1996/97 249700.0 112395.0 1795 
Source: Galal, M. Y. (1997) 
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Table A 4: Average Annual Crop Yields for Cotton, Wheat, Sorghum and Groundnuts  
 in the Gezira Scheme, 1970/71–2001/2002 
Year Barakat Kan-
tar/feddan 
Accala Kan-
tar/feddan 
Wheat 
ton/feddan 
Sorghum 
ton/feddan 
G/nuts 
ton/feddan 
1970/71 5.42 5.42 0.39 0.51 0.4 
1971/72 5 5 0.51 0.44 0.5 
1972/73 4.1 4.1 0.67 1 1.25 
1973/74 5.1 5.1 0.8 0.75 1.25 
1974/75 4.6 4.6 0.39 0.5 1.25 
1975/76 2.7 2.7 0.39 0.62 0.77 
1976/77 3.7 3.7 0.58 0.66 1.2 
1977/78 4.3 4.3 0.47 0.35 1.01 
1978/79 3.3 3.3 0.25 0.87 0.42 
1979/80 2.6 2.6 0.47 0.58 0.5 
1980/81 2.3 2.3 0.26 0.49 0.23 
1981/82 3.9 3.9 0.33 0.4 0.37 
1982/83 4.7 4.7 0.6 0.52 0.41 
1983/84 4.9 4.9 0.38 0.53 0.67 
1984/85 7.62 4.39 - 0.35 0.51 
1985/86 5.43 3.42 0.4 0.55 0.55 
1986/87 5.7 4.72 0.44 0.4 0.6 
1987/88 5.73 3.87 0.47 0.36 0.6 
1988/89 6.52 4.12 0.56 0.51 0.6 
1989/90 5.12 3.74 0.66 0.49 0.54 
1990/91 4.56 2.86 0.44 0.53 0.73 
1991/92 5.83 4.96 0.94 0.66 0.8 
1992/93 3.98 4.38 0.53 0.77 0.71 
1993/94 3.87 3.72 0.52 0.8 0.82 
1994/95 3.61 3.93 0.59 0.85 0.89 
1995/96 4.2 3.66 0.66 0.66 0.75 
1996/97 4.07 3.58 0.64 1.18 0.79 
1997/98 4.62 4.04 0.7 1.04 1.1 
1998/99 4.72 4.13 0.31 0.79 0.5 
1999/00 2.6 2.6 0.5 0.67 0.65 
2000/01 4.4 4.4 0.72 0.95 0.66 
2001/02 5.2 5.2 0.8 0.98 0.73 
Average 4.5 4.0 0.5 0.6 0.7 
Source: Unpublished records of the Gezira Scheme, Barakat, 1970–2002 
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Table A 5:  Average Annual Nominal Costs of Crop Production in the Gezira 
Scheme, 1970/71–2001/2002 (in LS/feddan) 
Year Cotton Wheat Sorghum G/nuts 
1970/71 41.55 10 11 14 
1971/72 44.91 12 12 15 
1972/73 44.76 12 11 13 
1973/74 48.82 14 9 14 
1974/75 58.57 18 13 18 
1975/76 81.14 15 12 20 
1976/77 84.96 27 12 22 
1977/78 92.26 29 13 24 
1978/79 105.7 22 15 26 
1979/80 127.72 65 19 38 
1980/81 107.86 40.8 24 46.91 
1981/82 233.89 93.41 44.91 73.77 
1982/83 293.95 124.28 55.99 90.51 
1983/84 426.2 140.8 96.89 135.11 
1984/85 443.62 n.a 102.26 132.83 
1985/86 777.59 273.21 159.73 200.96 
1986/87 834.93 275.78 158.68 262.66 
1987/88 1035.85 320.91 207.95 379.48 
1988/89 1580.7 558.71 367.66 480.93 
1989/90 1959.25 959.92 685.81 829.91 
1990/91 3319.13 2109.95 1594.05 2320.9 
1991/92 6853.44 5015 2613 4985.7 
1992/93 18556.91 8710 5900 7228.26 
1993/94 30585.07 18598 11210 15017 
1994/95 70000.33 34567 30811 36058 
1995/96 182307 86552 40455 58968 
1996/97 298624 191436 127770 149017 
1997/98 471855.84 241225 125333 194866 
1998/99 470909 244951 146326 191219 
1999/00 398785 269540 167190 211610 
2000/01 518570 304710 213690 226440 
2001/02 498315.5 325772 231640 245240 
Source: Unpublished records of the Gezira Scheme, Barakat, 1970–2002 
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Table A 6 a: Average Nominal Per Feddan Profits of Main Crops in the Gezira Scheme, 
1970/71–2001/2002 
Year Cotton* 
Ls/feddan 
Wheat* 
Ls/feddan 
Sorghum* 
Ls/feddan 
G/nuts* 
Ls/feddan 
Consumer price 
index** 
1970/71 41.82 4 -1 -4 0.7 
1971/72 32.17 7 -3 -1 0.8 
1972/73 44.56 8 18 53 0.9 
1973/74 39.52 23 58 55 1.1 
1974/75 25.78 7 13 70 1.3 
1975/76 95.35 10 19 28 1.5 
1976/77 44.95 17 20 30 1.8 
1977/78 80.73 20 17 63 2.2 
1978/79 59.94 -1 14 26 2.9 
1979/80 49.5 14 33 52 3.8 
1980/81 46.14 -3.46 26.5 92.31 4.8 
1981/82 151.91 -26.31 26.5 1.26 6.0 
1982/83 107.81 69.72 53.55 68.51 7.5 
1983/84 122.6 10 107.35 215.3 9.7 
1984/85 258.1 n.a 358.35 137.89 13.1 
1985/86 -0.01 30.1 101.02 414.8 17.7 
1986/87 375.7 133.93 5.37 330.11 24.7 
1987/88 334.28 201.26 254.64 289.98 31.1 
1988/89 1299.58 790.09 152.8 131.45 46.2 
1989/90 746.91 903.08 737.36 1278.99 81.5 
1990/91 -285.58 861.67 4081.48 5642.36 100.0 
1991/92 3147.18 3164 2330 7895.29 305.0 
1992/93 1105.8 -1872 941 4688.6 650.9 
1993/94 16478.94 5580 11844 16983 1310.9 
1994/95 57033 10433 16839 42335 2843.1 
1995/96 155314 82628 38595 34997 4787.5 
1996/97 162815 66721 141230 65304 2293.7 
1997/98 38502 27772 101377 73634 3452.1 
1998/99 11420 -97591 45724 49526 4299.8 
1999/00 -54770.3 30460 47310 35190 5073.0 
2000/01 190887 135290 174862 57560 5451.9 
2001/02 577882 34228 84440 55500 5860a 
a estimate 
Source:   * Unpublished records of the Gezira Scheme, Barakat, 1970–2002 
 ** Appendix 5.2a 
The Gezira Scheme: Perspectives for Sustainable Development 
 
55
 
 
Table A 6 b: Average Net Per Feddan Real Profits of Main Crops in the Gezira Scheme, 1970/71–
2001/2002 (in Deflated Ls, 1990/91 = 100) 
Year Cotton Wheat Sorghum G/nuts 
1970/71 59.7 5.7 -1.4 -5.7 
1971/72 40.2 8.8 -3.8 -1.3 
1972/73 49.5 8.9 20.0 58.9 
1973/74 35.9 20.9 52.7 50.0 
1974/75 19.8 5.4 10.0 53.8 
1975/76 63.6 6.7 12.4 18.7 
1976/77 25.0 9.4 11.1 16.7 
1977/78 36.7 9.1 7.7 28.6 
1978/79 20.7 -0.3 4.8 9.0 
1979/80 13.0 3.7 8.7 13.7 
1980/81 9.6 -0.7 5.5 19.2 
1981/82 25.3 -4.4 4.4 0.2 
1982/83 14.4 9.3 7.1 9.1 
1983/84 12.6 1.0 11.1 22.2 
1984/85 19.7 - 27.4 10.5 
1985/86 0.0 1.7 5.7 23.4 
1986/87 15.2 5.4 0.2 13.4 
1987/88 10.7 6.5 8.2 9.3 
1988/89 28.1 17.1 3.3 2.8 
1989/90 9.2 11.1 9.0 15.7 
1990/91 -2.9 8.6 40.8 56.4 
1991/92 10.3 10.4 7.6 25.9 
1992/93 1.7 -2.9 1.4 7.2 
1993/94 12.7 4.3 9.0 20.1 
1994/95 20.1 3.7 5.9 14.9 
1995/96 32.4 17.3 8.1 7.3 
1996/97 70.1 29.1 61.6 28.5 
1997/98 11.2 8.0 29.4 21.3 
1998/99 2.7 -22.7 10.6 11.5 
1999/00 -10.8 6.0 9.3 6.9 
2000/01 35.0 24.8 32.1 10.6 
2001/02 98.6 5.8 14.4 9.5 
Source: Unpublished Records of the Gezira Scheme, 1970–2000 
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Table A 7: Average Crop Output of Main Crops in the Gezira Scheme, 
1970/71–2001/2002 
Year Cotton 
(1000 kantar) 
Wheat 
(1000 ton) 
Sorghum 
(1000 ton) 
G/nuts 
(1000 ton) 
1970/71 3187.0 56.2 149.9 59.6 
1971/72 2939.1 66.8 129.4 58.5 
1972/73 2403.1 97.2 295.0 222.5 
1973/74 3056.2 203.2 225.8 270.0 
1974/75 2773.8 166.9 77.0 451.3 
1975/76 1077.1 221.5 211.4 326.5 
1976/77 1826.3 292.9 231.7 301.2 
1977/78 2226.5 219.0 123.9 266.6 
1978/79 1628.5 123.3 299.3 91.1 
1979/80 1412.0 170.6 189.7 114.5 
1980/81 1157.3 95.4 147.5 39.3 
1981/82 1683.5 88.1 137.6 97.7 
1982/83 2260.3 93.0 166.9 60.7 
1983/84 2455.1 100.7 217.8 91.1 
1984/85 2427.3 n.a 147.0 108.6 
1985/86 1419.5 97.2 318.5 56.7 
1986/87 2033.5 79.2 195.2 90.6 
1987/88 1750.3 118.4 142.2 96.0 
1988/89 2100.8 153.4 217.8 66.6 
1989/90 1482.1 258.7 216.1 43.2 
1990/91 928.7 269.7 268.7 29.2 
1991/92 1213.9 501.0 478.5 28.8 
1992/93 726.3 272.4 478.9 116.4 
1993/94 580.5 272.0 437.6 153.3 
1994/95 984.2 231.9 397.8 170.0 
1995/96 1246.1 258.1 260.0 172.5 
1996/97 1267.7 249.6 480.3 194.3 
1997/98 1102.1 211.4 352.6 231.9 
1998/99 680.7 38.1 225.2 73.0 
1999/00 668.2 29.5 183.6 100.8 
2000/01 929.8 56.8 483.6 112.9 
2001/02 997.5 64.8 665.4 32.9 
Source: Unpublished records of the Gezira Scheme, Barakat, 1970–2002 
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Table A 8: Average Nominal Farm Gate Price for the Main Crops in the Gezira 
Scheme, 1970/71–2001/2002 
Year Cotton 
(Ls/kantar) 
Wheat 
(Ls/ton/) 
Sorghum 
(Ls/ton) 
G/nuts 
(Ls/ton 
1970/71 15.4 35.0 20.0 22.0 
1971/72 15.4 37.3 20.0 27.7 
1972/73 21.9 37.3 43.2 52.4 
1973/74 21.8 40.0 43.2 55.2 
1974/75 18.3 63.3 71.0 58.6 
1975/76 64.9 65.0 31.3 62.8 
1976/77 35.5 65.0 48.5 60.4 
1977/78 40.3 75.0 80.4 69.6 
1978/79 50.7 85.0 84.3 131.0 
1979/80 67.9 118.0 180.0 78.0 
1980/81 67.0 160.0 180.0 263.0 
1981/82 98.9 230.0 250.0 165.0 
1982/83 85.5 280.0 200.0 150.0 
1983/84 112.0 360.0 224.0 280.0 
1984/85 134.9 1200.0 275.0 531.0 
1985/86 222.2 700.0 474.0 1130.0 
1986/87 247.1 770.0 410.0 983.0 
1987/88 297.4 1010.0 1292.0 1108.0 
1988/89 553.9 2400.0 1033.0 1021.0 
1989/90 660.0 3000.0 2904.0 3905.0 
1990/91 819.9 6000.0 12724.0 8192.0 
1991/92 1785.8 8750.0 7500.0 16061.0 
1992/93 4681.6 19000.0 8850.0 16784.0 
1993/94 12067.7 70000.0 27000.0 39200.0 
1994/95 32572.6 75000.0 50000.0 98000.0 
1995/96 82346.6 220000.0 110000.0 112000.0 
1996/97 118317.7 400000.0 220000.0 232708.0 
1997/98 113412.9 380849.0 240577.0 273000.0 
1998/99 109620.2 450000.0 220000.0 364000.0 
1999/00 132313.5 600000.0 300000.0 375200.0 
2000/01 128992.2 550000.0 357500.0 346000.0 
2001/02 203056.1 450000.0 288000.0 308000.0 
Source: Unpublished records of the Gezira Scheme, Barakat, 1970–2002 
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Table A 9: Volume of Annual Exports of Cotton, Groundnuts and Sor-
ghum, Sudan, 1970/71–2001/2002 
Year Cotton 
(1000 bales) 
Groundnut 
(1000 tons) 
Sorghum 
(1000 tons) 
1970/71 1204.2 16.6 2.0 
1971/72 1252.2 14.4 37.4 
1972/73 1291.1 18.2 59.9 
1973/74 416.6 99.1 89.2 
1974/75 783.3 205.0 3.6 
1975/76 968.6 282.8 74.5 
1976/77 1007.7 143.3 103.8 
1977/78 787.6 97.2 46.9 
1978/79 998.9 37.4 172.0 
1979/80 617.1 22.1 286.2 
1980/81 343.3 94.3 241.3 
1981/82 468.1 89.0 417.8 
1982/83 1128.5 18.0 256.2 
1983/84 967.1 22.5 24.9 
1984/85 529.3 13.3 24.9 
1985/86 936.9 1.1 30.5 
1986/87 938.8 7.3 534.2 
1987/88 836.2 69.1 237.1 
1988/89 915.4 5.7 308.0 
1989/90 921.7 0.0 100.0 
1990/91 659.7 0.0 0.0 
1991/92 455.5 0.5 0.0 
1992/93 397.9 0.5 0.0 
1993/94 417.0 6.2 117.0 
1994/95 441.5 4.6 406.9 
1995/96 480.9 2.2 17.3 
1996/97 417.8 14.8 0.0 
1997/98 392.5 25.4 35.1 
1998/99 194.5 0.4 279.7 
1999/00 232.8 10.0 105.3 
2000/01 233.7 17.3 2.2 
Source: Bank of Sudan (1970–2002) 
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Table A 10: Value of Annual Cotton Exports, Total Exports and  
Agricultural Exports, Sudan, 1974/75–2001/2002 
Year Cotton exports 
US $ 
Total exports 
US $ 
Agricultural exports
US $ 
1974/75 123605.7 348600.0 331368.6 
1975/76 200551.4 435622.9 411780.0 
1976/77 279437.1 551445.7 525508.6 
1977/78 375888.6 657660.0 631480.0 
1978/79 276136.8 532476.3 512244.7 
1979/80 360142.9 553969.0 536181.0 
1980/81 177601.5 417450.8 393696.9 
1981/82 62415.5 324541.8 302588.2 
1982/83 93176.9 371616.2 319067.7 
1983/84 263979.3 540437.3 520952.7 
1984/85 135000.0 272431.0 260739.3 
1985/86 88061.2 198756.2 191978.4 
1986/87 73344.2 166641.0 160675.8 
1987/88 56899.5 187135.1 179863.9 
1988/89 97843.5 229088.0 222593.2 
1989/90 134879.4 302310.5 296194.7 
1990/91 140000.0 365000.0 n.a. 
1991/92 116000.0 305000.0 n.a. 
1992/93 65300.0 319300.0 n.a. 
1993/94 57100.0 417300.0 n.a. 
1994/95 96634.0 523891.0 472399 
1995/96 122951.0 555674.0 495441 
1996/97 128209.0 620186.0 551074 
1997/98 105662.0 594182.0 540108 
1998/99 95124.0 595741.0 545000 
1999/00 44259.0 780058.0 439884 
2000/01 52863.0 1806708.0 399239 
2001/02 44378.0 1698703.0 265516 
Source: 1. Bank of Sudan (1970–2002) 
2. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (1997–2001) 
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Table A 11: Example for Calculation of Social Prices of Various Crops for PAM Analysis: Social  
Price of Acala Cotton, 1998/99 
FOB export parity price at  
Port Sudan (US Cent/Lb) = 53.3 
FOB export parity price at  
Port Sudan (US $/Balea) = 223.9 
Multiplied by SERb 2219.2 
Equals: Export parity prices at Port Sudan, Ls/bale = 496790.1 
Less: 
Fees of sea port corporations, Ls/bale = 24839.5 
Export tax, Ls/bale = 39743.2 
Handling costs, Ls/bale = 2087.0 
SCCc fees, Ls/bale  = 4967.9 
Fees of export companies, Ls/bale = 4967.9 
Othersd, Ls/bale = 16000.0 
Transportation to Port Sudan, Ls/bale = 15000.0 
Total, Ls/bale = 107605.5 
Price at factory, Ls/bale = 389184.6 
Price of 115 Lbe lint cotton, Ls = 106562.4 
Price of 185 Lbe cotton seed, Ls = 44736.6 
Price of 6 Lbe scard cotton, Ls =  4864.4 
Price of one kantare of seed cotton =  156163.5 
Cost of ginning, Ls/kantar = 22000.0 
Farm gate parity price of seed cotton at 
Gezira, Ls/kantar = 134163.5 
a One bale of lint cotton equals 420 pounds 
b SER stands for shadow exchange rate 
c SCC stands for Sudan cotton Company 
d and e One kantar of seed cotton equals 315 ponds. One kantar of barakat seed cotton yields 115  
 pounds lint cotton plus 185 pounds of cotton seed plus 6 pounds scard cotton. 
Source: 1. Sudan Cotton Company (1997–2002) 
 2. Bank of Sudan (1997–2002) 
 3. Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (1997–2002) 
